It is common for lenders to require borrowers to agree to pay a higher interest rate, known as the default rate, following an event of default under a loan. Some loan agreements also require the borrower to pay a fee in the event of a late payment. If the borrower files for bankruptcy protection, the Bankruptcy Code affords special protection to secured creditors with respect to collecting interest.
It is common knowledge that the Bankruptcy Code provides a debtor with a “fresh start” by allowing it to discharge prepetition claims. Similarly, section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code allows a trustee or debtor in possession to sell property of the estate “free and clear” of prior claims. These two concepts, while relatively straightforward, raise a fundamental question — when does a creditor hold a “claim” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code?
In the 2010 decision of In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 599 F.3d 298 (3d. Cir. 2010), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a plan proponent could deny a secured creditor the right to credit bid on its collateral when the sale was made pursuant to a plan of reorganization. That holding was a surprise to many given that secured creditors were specifically authorized to credit bid in stand-alone sales under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. A year or so later, another circuit court, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, came to the opposite conclusion.
The First Chamber of the Supreme Court recently handed down a decision dealing with the constitutionality of one of the timeframes set by the Bankruptcy Law for filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy proceedings.
Asbestos settlement trusts are a major source of payment of asbestos claims in the United States, with over fifty such trusts instituted as of March, 2011.1 While insurance recoveries are a principal source of funding for these trusts, courts generally have not allowed insurers to challenge chapter 11 plans where they are found to be “insurance neutral.” A plan is insurance neutral where the plan does not increase an insurer’s pre-petition liabilities or impair an insurer’s contractual rights under its insurance policies.
Whether post-death creditor protection is available to inherited IRAs under the 2005 Bankruptcy Act has been the subject of a number of cases decided in the last several years. The argument made by bankruptcy trustees is that, on the death of the IRA owner, the IRA ceases to be “retirement funds” as it is not the retirement funds of the beneficiary. Consequently, the bankruptcy trustees argue that the inherited IRA ceases to have the protection afforded to IRAs under the Bankruptcy Code.
The absolute priority rule of Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code is a fundamental creditor protection in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. In general terms, the rule provides that if a class of unsecured creditors rejects a debtor’s reorganization plan and is not paid in full, junior creditors and equity interestholders may not receive or retain any property under the plan. The rule thus implements the general state-law principle that creditors are entitled to payment before shareholders, unless creditors agree to a different result.
Code Section 409A is, in part, a response to perceived deferred compensation abuses at companies like Enron and WorldCom. The story of Code Section 409A’s six month delay provision is inextricably tied to the Enron and WorldCom bankruptcies.
Following the failure of over 400 financial institutions since the beginning of 2008, the FDIC has clarified its expectations with respect to collection and retention of bank documents by directors and officers of troubled or failing financial institutions for the purpose of explaining or defending their conduct.
A New York trial court recently held that affiliates and subsidiaries of a bankrupt Mexican holding company were liable as guarantors on indentures issued by the corporation, despite ongoing Mexican bankruptcy proceedings that could potentially discharge their liability under Mexican law. Wilmington Trust, National Assoc. v. Vitro Automotriz, S.A. De C.V., et al., No. 652303/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011).