Editors’ Note: The Supreme Court’s Jevic ruling last spring remains a treasure trove of bankruptcy theory, suitable for the novice bankruptcy student and highly instructional for those of us who have practiced in chapter 11 for years. We at The Bankruptcy Cave like it so much that we will be offering a few more posts in upcoming weeks on the lower courts’ interpretation of Jevic since the spring, the continued efforts in Delaware to sidestep Jevic, and other important learning from the case.

One of the primary reasons that most debtors seek bankruptcy relief is the automatic stay, which prevents creditors from pursuing collection efforts outside of the bankruptcy proceedings. Creditors can, however, seek relief from the automatic stay from the bankruptcy court under certain circumstances.

On July 16, 2014, the Uniform Law Commission (the “Commission”) approved a series of changes to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the “UFTA”). The UFTA had previously been adopted by most states in the country, including Michigan. The Commission’s amendments included changing the name of the law from the UFTA to the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (the “UVTA”).

What happens in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case when a creditor files a proof of claim involving a debt for which the statute of limitations to collect the debt has run? More specifically, does the filing of such a claim violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “Act”)? That’s the issue considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in its recent decision in the case of Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson. 1

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit (the “Court”) considered the issue of asset “abandonment” in a Chapter 7 case[1]. The Court reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision to allow the Chapter 7 trustee to compromise a claim that the debtor argued the trustee had abandoned.

Background

Overview

Last December, we updated you that the Supreme Court was considering whether to grant review of In re The Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 814 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016). Our original post is here. On March 27, 2017, the Supreme Court granted review of Village at Lakeridge, but only as to one question presented, the most boring one in our view.

In the case of Susan G. Brown v. Douglas Ellmann [1], the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (the “Sixth Circuit”) recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision to deny a Chapter 7 debtor’s proposed exemptions for the value of redemption rights she enjoyed under Michigan law related to the sale of a property she surrendered to the bankruptcy estate.

Background

Dishonest plaintiffs can make it difficult, and in some cases impossible, to successfully move for summary judgment. Indeed, a dishonest plaintiff who understands the legal landscape can easily defeat summary judgment by claiming that there exists “direct evidence” of discrimination in the form of an admission by management that the challenged employment action was motivated by discriminatory animus (e.g., “my supervisor told me he was firing me because of my age”).

Editor’s Note: On June 16, 2016, The Bankruptcy Cave gave you our previous summary of the controversial Sabine decision.