Have you ever had to press garlic for a recipe? Or put together a Swedish bookshelf, purchased from a Swedish superstore? Yes, you have – and you may have succeeded, so long as you had a garlic press, or the bag of special Swedish tools respectively. But what if you don’t? Yikes.
Trade creditors often face the issue of whether they are required to continue providing goods or services on credit to a customer that has filed chapter 11 bankruptcy. Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy Code fails to specifically address the rights and obligations of a trade creditor facing this dilemma, resulting in a tug-of-war created by the debtor’s need for continued goods and services and the creditor’s need for assurance of payment.
Your tenant files for bankruptcy-what’s your move? Debtors who are lessees under real property leases have certain rights regarding their lease under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. Essentially, the debtor has two options: 1) reject the lease or 2) assume the lease, provided that the debtor can cure any defaults existing under the lease. Additionally, the debtor may have the right to assume and assign the lease to a third party.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed whether estate professionals could recover fees expended in defending fee applications. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U.S. _____ (2015). A divided court ruled that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) allowed compensation only for “actual, necessary services rendered[,]” and that to allow fees for defending fee applications would be contrary to the statute and the “American Rule” that each litigant pay her own attorneys’ fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.
Over the years, the United States Supreme Court has had to interpret ambiguous, imprecise, and otherwise puzzling language in the Bankruptcy Code, including the phrases “claim,” “interest in property,” “ordinary course of business,” “applicable nonbankruptcy law,” “allowed secured claim,” “willful and malicious injury,” “on account of,” “value, as of the effective date of the plan,” “projected disposable income,” “defalcation,” and “retirement funds.” The interpretive principles employed by the Court in interpreting the peculiarities of the Bankruptcy Code were in full view when the Court r
Following up on our coverage in the recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling that a debtor in a Chapter 7 case cannot ‘strip off’ or void a wholly unsecured junior mortgage under section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, I had the opportunity to discuss the ruling with Colin O’Keefe of LXBN TV.
The English High Court in Fondazione Enasarco v Lehman Brothers Finance S.A. and Anthracite Rated Investments (Cayman) Limited [2015] EWHC 1307 (Ch) applied a common sense approach in the circumstances to the determination of Loss under the 1992 ISDA Master Agreement. The judgment of the judge (Mr Justice David Richards) is useful reading for those involved in structured products and derivatives.
Background
This morning, the United States Supreme Court ruled that debtors in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases cannot “strip off,” or completely void, junior mortgages that—based on the value of the property and the amount of claims secured by senior mortgages—are completely underwater.
Timely proof of claim filings by secured creditors have “been a thorn in the side of many Chapter 13 cases involving secured creditors,” according to Judge Wood in In re Pajian. However, a recent Seventh Circuit decision may cause the industry to revise their current process for proof of claim filings. Bankruptcy Rule 3002(c) requires creditors to file proofs of claim within 90 days of the date set for the meeting of creditors. Bankruptcy courts have come to conflicting conclusions on whether Rule 3002(c)’s deadline applies to all creditors or merely unsecured ones.