Lest you thought you had heard the end of the Stern v. Marshall debate, two recent circuit court decisions remind us that Stern is alive and influential. In October, the Sixth Circuit weighed in on a bankruptcy court’s constitutional authority where it discharged certain fraudulent debts and awarded damages. In early December, the Ninth Circuit performed a similar constitutional analysis where the bankruptcy court decided a fraudulent transfer action against a noncreditor of the bankruptcy estate.
Reinhardt v. Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance Inc. (In re Reinhardt)
563 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. Ohio 2009)
In an opinion issued May 12, 2009, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that a Michigan contractor’s obligations to a subcontractor would not be discharged. Sameer Patel v. Shamrock Floorcovering Services, Inc. No. 08-1265.
On August 26, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a state-court judgment that modifies a discharge order is void ab initio.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit became the first circuit court to rule on the issue of whether a bankruptcy court has authority to retain a case filed in improper venue. The Court found that a bankruptcy court may not retain jurisdiction on a case that was filed in an improper venue. In Thompson v. Greenwood, 507 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2007), the Sixth Circuit follows strict statutory construction in holding that where there is improper venue a bankruptcy court must dismiss the case or transfer it to a district where it could have been brought originally.
On July 17, 2008, in Phar-Mor, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. (Nos 05-4525/4526), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the Northern District of Ohio's ruling that a vendor's administrative expense priority on its reclamation claim survives, even after the goods that are subject to reclamation are sold and the proceeds are used to satisfy a secured creditor's superior claim. Full text of the opinion.
Facts
In a decision issued on June 26, 2008, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the earmarking doctrine does not provide a refuge for late-perfecting secured creditors and thus does not shield the creditor from preference exposure in a subsequently filed bankruptcy case.Lee v. Shapiro.
In Geygan v. World Savings Bank, FSB, 2008 FED App. 0005P (6th Cir. B.A.P. Mar. 12, 2008), the Sixth Circuit BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court, holding that the mortgage’s certificate of acknowledgment, which included the phrase “witness my hand” next to the notary’s signature, did not comply with Ohio law, and that the Trustee was a bona fide purchaser pursuant to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
In Kendrick v. Deutsche National Trust Company (In re Saint Clair), 380 B.R. 478 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Jan. 16, 2008), the Chapter 7 Trustee appealed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky to the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”). The issue on appeal was whether summary judgment was warranted against the Appellee-Mortgagor (“Mortgagor”) on the Appellant- Trustee’s (“Trustee”) complaint seeking to avoid a mortgage on the Debtors’ real property.