In a recent important decision, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals held that a trademark licensor could not use its bankruptcy to deny the rights of a licensee to use the trademark pursuant to a pre-bankruptcy agreement. (Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 11-3920, decided July 9, 2012) This decision creates a conflict among the federal circuits, which often means the U.S. Supreme Court must eventually decide the issue.

One of the benefits to a corporate form of entity is the protection of shareholders from liability for obligations of the corporation. Of course, as we all know, there are still legal claims which could impose liability on a corporate shareholder for obligations of the corporation. In a recent case, a former executive of a corporation tried to assert a tortious interference claim against a majority shareholder, when it terminated severance payments that were owed to the executive. (Nation v. American Capital, Ltd., 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, Case No.

The common law has long recognized a secured creditor’s duty to provide reasonable notice to borrowers before enforcing its security and appointing a receiver. The practical importance of this has become less significant since the codification of the principle of reasonable notice in section 244 of theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”). However, in the recent case of Bank of Montreal v.

In the midst of the ongoing restructurings of Nortel and AbitibiBowater, the New Democrats introduced Bill C-501 in the spring of 2010 to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”) and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) with the goal of better protecting employees’ interests in the context of formal insolvency proceedings, including pension interests. However, Bill C-501 did not become law.

Introduction

In “True Lease v. Security Lease – Is the Distinction Still Relevant?” which appeared in the June 2008 issue of Collateral Matters, Jill Fraser discussed a 2007 amendment to the Personal Property Security Act (Ontario) (the “PPSA”) and whether or not the distinction between a true lease and a security lease was still relevant in light of that amendment.

Masuda, Funai, Eifert & Mitchell routinely represents creditors in bankruptcy proceedings in order to protect their contractual and legal interests and rights to payment. The following is a list of some recent larger U.S. bankruptcy filings in various industries. To the extent you are a creditor to any of these debtors, or other entities which may have filed for bankruptcy protection, you as a creditor are entitled to certain protections under the Bankruptcy Code.

AUTOMOTIVE

Section 11.01 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) states that no order under Section 11 or 11.02 of the CCAA has the effect of: (a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, the use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or (b) requiring the further advance of money or credit.

As most are aware by now, the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) recently caused alarm by finding that claims of pension plan beneficiaries ranked higher than the super-priority debtor-in-possession financing charge (the “DIP Charge”) created by the amended initial order (the “CCAA Order”) in the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) proceedings of the Indalex group of Canadian companies (collectively, “Indalex”).

During the past 14 months, courts in Ontario have rendered three decisions dealing with the application of limitation periods to claims for fraudulent conveyances or preferences. A “limitation period” is a period of time, specified in a statute, within which a plaintiff must commence a court proceeding to seek a remedy. Otherwise, the claim is said to be “statute-barred” and an action to enforce the claim will be dismissed.

The recent decisions have brought some clarity to the law in this area, but have left other questions unanswered.

Background

In the recent case of Peterborough (City) v. Kawartha Native Housing Society, the Ontario Court of Appeal was asked to determine: