On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a 2-1 opinion, recognized a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case could be dismissed through a “structured dismissal” that deviates from the priority scheme set forth in Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code.1 With its decision, the Third Circuit joined the Second Circuit in rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s per se exclusion on “structured dismissals” that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s prio
As the market for so-called “unitranche” credit facilities continues to increase, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court had an opportunity recently to answer positively the question of whether bankruptcy courts will enforce the Agreement Among Lenders (“AAL”) (a form of intercreditor agreement) used in such structures.
Background: Grupo OAS, a Brazilian construction conglomerate linked to a massive corruption scandal (“OAS”), filed for Chapter 15 creditor protection in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on April 15, 2015, two weeks after entering bankruptcy in Brazil. If “recognized” by Bankruptcy Judge Stuart Bernstein, the Chapter 15 petition would, among other things, essentially bind OAS creditors in the United States to the restructuring terms approved by the Brazilian court overseeing OAS’s reorganization.
On March 12, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the authority of a bankruptcy court to issue non-consensual, non-debtor releases in connection with the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.1 With this decision, the Eleventh Circuit joined the majority view that such releases are permissible under certain circumstances.
Background
On January 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered an opinion holding that an authorized UCC-3 termination statement is effective, for purposes of Delaware’s Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”), to terminate the perfection of the underlying security interest even though the secured lender never intended to extinguish the security interest and mistakenly authorized the filing.1
Background
On October 17, 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court entered an opinion holding that a UCC-3 termination statement that is authorized by the secured party is effective to terminate the original UCC filing even though the secured party did not actually intend to extinguish the underlying security interest.1 Because the court determined that the relevant section of Delaware’s Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”) is unambiguous and
On October 16, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit entered an order requiring a real estate lender, First National Bank (the “Lender”), to refund certain mortgage payments it received from Protective Health Management (the “Debtor”), an affiliate of its borrower.1 Because the mortgage payments constituted actual fraudulent transfers, the Fifth Circuit held that the Lender could retain the payments only to the extent of the value of the Debtor’s continued use of the property.2&
Another bankruptcy court—this time in New York—has weighed in on the issue of whether “make whole” provisions are enforceable in bankruptcy. See In re MPM Silicones, LLC, et al. (a/k/a Momentive Performance Materials).
As the wave of litigation spawned by the 2008 financial crisis begins to ebb, insurance-coverage litigation arising out of the credit crisis continues unabated. Financial institutions have successfully pursued insurance coverage for many credit-crisis claims under directors and officers (D&O) and errors and omissions (E&O) policies that they purchased to protect themselves against wrongful-act claims brought by their customers, but in response, some insurers continue to raise inapplicable exclusions in an attempt to diminish or limit coverage for their policyholders.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (the “Court”) issued an opinion limiting the ability of a “loan to own” secured creditor to credit bid at an auction for the sale of substantially all of the debtors’ assets.1 The Court focused on the fact that the creditor’s conduct interfered with the sale process and was motivated by its desire to “own the Debtors’ business” rather than to have its d