On Sunday, May 1st, Energy Future Holdings Corp. (“EFH”) filed a new joint chapter 11 plan of reorganization and disclosure statement (the “New Plan”) after plans to fund EFH’s exit from bankruptcy by selling its Oncor power distribution business failed.

BACKGROUND

In the high-profile bankruptcy case of Energy Future Holdings Corp. (“EFH”) a Delaware bankruptcy court recently called into question reliance on structural subordination as a way to protect a borrower’s assets from satisfying claims against an affiliated company. In the EFH bankruptcy case, holders of unsecured PIK notes issued by EFH subsidiary Energy Future Intermediate Holdings Company LLC (“EFIH”) sought to collect post-petition interest at the rate stated in the notes issued by EFIH.

An important battle about the place of secured lending in the United States economy is set to begin. When the battle ends, fundamental assumptions about the expected recovery rates for defaulted secured loans may change.

It has not taken long for another bankruptcy court to question the propriety of allowing secured creditors to credit bid their loans. You may recall that in the case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. a Delaware bankruptcy court limited a creditor’s ability to credit bid based on self-serving testimony from a competing bidder that it would not participate in an auction absent the court capping the secured creditor’s credit bid.

In a recent decision that has captured the attention of the U.S. secondary loan market, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington starkly concluded that hedge funds “that acquire distressed debt and engage in predatory lending” were not eligible buyers of a loan under a loan agreement because they were not “financial institutions” within the Court’s understanding of the phrase.

A recent decision in the bankruptcy case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. has called into question a long-held belief that secured creditors hold dear: that debt purchased at a discount can nonetheless be credit bid at its full face amount at a collateral sale. While it remains to be seen how other courts will interpret Fisker, this decision has the potential to restrict participation in Bankruptcy Code section 363 sales and dampen liquidity in the robust secondary markets.

Recently, in connection with the bankruptcy case of KB Toys, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals disallowed a claim held by a claim purchaser, citing that the original holder of the claim had received a preference payment prior to the bankruptcy case.¹ The ruling affirmed an earlier decision of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, which we discussed in a previous memorandum², in which the Bankruptcy Court held that (i) a claim in the hands of a transferee has the same rights and disabilities as the claim had in the hands of the original claimant; and (ii) disabilities attach t

An important decision by Judge Kevin Carey of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently focused the distressed debt market (and financial creditors in general) on the proper legal characterization of a common financing provision — the “make-whole premium.”¹ Judge Carey allowed a lender’s claim in bankruptcy for the full amount of a large make-whole premium, after denying a motion by the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee to disallow the claim.

 WHY DOES THIS DECISION MATTER?

The U.S. bankruptcy claims trading market has grown in recent years, from one with a few specialized firms investing in small vendor trade claims into a multibillion dollar industry. Major investment banks and hedge funds now regularly buy and sell claims arising from a variety of transactions, including swap terminations, litigation judgments, debt issuances and rejected real estate and equipment leases. With individual claim amounts frequently in the millions (and sometimes billions) of dollars, the volume of claims bought and sold has increased significantly.

The ISDA Master Agreement¹ serves as the basis for the vast majority of overthe- counter derivatives transactions. Two fundamental principles of the ISDA Master Agreement are: (1) upon the default of one party to a swap, the nondefaulting counterparty may terminate the swap, calculate its loss and claim damages; and (2) the obligation of each party to a swap to make payments to the other is subject to the satisfaction of the conditions precedent that no default has occurred with respect to the other party.