When considering whether or not to bring a legal action, it is important to establish if it is competent and commercially worthwhile to do so. The ability to bring, or continue with, legal proceedings against a company can be restricted if that company enters into a formal insolvency process. The position of creditors may be improved now that the Third Party (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 has at last been brought into force.
Bankruptcy made clearer: One of the bastions of old-style Scots terminology, guaranteed to perplex Southern audiences, is the law of bankruptcy in Scotland as it applies to individuals and assorted others.
But maybe for no longer. The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 has reached the statute book. It’s a consolidating act, encompassing statutes from 1985, 1993, 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2014. It introduces a new and fairly modern framework, the aim being to make it less cumbersome and easier to use by those who do not have intimate knowledge of it (most of us!).
The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 (the “Act”) received Royal Assent on 28 April 2016 and is expected to come into force by the end of the year.
The Act is only the second piece of primary consolidation legislation to have passed through the Scottish Parliament and brings together the various laws on personal insolvency into a single piece of legislation.
At the moment, the law is rather unwieldy and difficult to follow in practice.
On Sunday, May 1st, Energy Future Holdings Corp. (“EFH”) filed a new joint chapter 11 plan of reorganization and disclosure statement (the “New Plan”) after plans to fund EFH’s exit from bankruptcy by selling its Oncor power distribution business failed.
BACKGROUND
In the high-profile bankruptcy case of Energy Future Holdings Corp. (“EFH”) a Delaware bankruptcy court recently called into question reliance on structural subordination as a way to protect a borrower’s assets from satisfying claims against an affiliated company. In the EFH bankruptcy case, holders of unsecured PIK notes issued by EFH subsidiary Energy Future Intermediate Holdings Company LLC (“EFIH”) sought to collect post-petition interest at the rate stated in the notes issued by EFIH.
An important battle about the place of secured lending in the United States economy is set to begin. When the battle ends, fundamental assumptions about the expected recovery rates for defaulted secured loans may change.
It has not taken long for another bankruptcy court to question the propriety of allowing secured creditors to credit bid their loans. You may recall that in the case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. a Delaware bankruptcy court limited a creditor’s ability to credit bid based on self-serving testimony from a competing bidder that it would not participate in an auction absent the court capping the secured creditor’s credit bid.
In a recent decision that has captured the attention of the U.S. secondary loan market, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington starkly concluded that hedge funds “that acquire distressed debt and engage in predatory lending” were not eligible buyers of a loan under a loan agreement because they were not “financial institutions” within the Court’s understanding of the phrase.
A recent decision in the bankruptcy case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. has called into question a long-held belief that secured creditors hold dear: that debt purchased at a discount can nonetheless be credit bid at its full face amount at a collateral sale. While it remains to be seen how other courts will interpret Fisker, this decision has the potential to restrict participation in Bankruptcy Code section 363 sales and dampen liquidity in the robust secondary markets.
Recently, in connection with the bankruptcy case of KB Toys, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals disallowed a claim held by a claim purchaser, citing that the original holder of the claim had received a preference payment prior to the bankruptcy case.1 The ruling affirmed an earlier decision of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, which we discussed in a previous memorandum2, in which the Bankruptcy Court held that (i) a claim in the hands of a transferee has the same rights and disabilities as the claim had in the hands of the original claimant; and (ii) disabilities attach t