It has not taken long for another bankruptcy court to question the propriety of allowing secured creditors to credit bid their loans. You may recall that in the case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. a Delaware bankruptcy court limited a creditor’s ability to credit bid based on self-serving testimony from a competing bidder that it would not participate in an auction absent the court capping the secured creditor’s credit bid.
In a recent decision that has captured the attention of the U.S. secondary loan market, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington starkly concluded that hedge funds “that acquire distressed debt and engage in predatory lending” were not eligible buyers of a loan under a loan agreement because they were not “financial institutions” within the Court’s understanding of the phrase.
A recent decision in the bankruptcy case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. has called into question a long-held belief that secured creditors hold dear: that debt purchased at a discount can nonetheless be credit bid at its full face amount at a collateral sale. While it remains to be seen how other courts will interpret Fisker, this decision has the potential to restrict participation in Bankruptcy Code section 363 sales and dampen liquidity in the robust secondary markets.
Recently, in connection with the bankruptcy case of KB Toys, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals disallowed a claim held by a claim purchaser, citing that the original holder of the claim had received a preference payment prior to the bankruptcy case.1 The ruling affirmed an earlier decision of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, which we discussed in a previous memorandum2, in which the Bankruptcy Court held that (i) a claim in the hands of a transferee has the same rights and disabilities as the claim had in the hands of the original claimant; and (ii) disabilities attach t
An important decision by Judge Kevin Carey of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently focused the distressed debt market (and financial creditors in general) on the proper legal characterization of a common financing provision — the “make-whole premium.”1 Judge Carey allowed a lender’s claim in bankruptcy for the full amount of a large make-whole premium, after denying a motion by the Unsecured Creditors’ Committee to disallow the claim.
WHY DOES THIS DECISION MATTER?
The U.S. bankruptcy claims trading market has grown in recent years, from one with a few specialized firms investing in small vendor trade claims into a multibillion dollar industry. Major investment banks and hedge funds now regularly buy and sell claims arising from a variety of transactions, including swap terminations, litigation judgments, debt issuances and rejected real estate and equipment leases. With individual claim amounts frequently in the millions (and sometimes billions) of dollars, the volume of claims bought and sold has increased significantly.
The Illinois Supreme Court recently provided certainty to dissolving corporations with respect to the risk of facing a lawsuit even after it has long since dissolved. Illinois permits lawsuits against dissolved corporations for up to five years after the corporation has ceased to exist. The Supreme Court clarified that only those claims that have accrued prior to the corporation's dissolution (i.e., the injury occurred prior to dissolution) may be brought in that five-year period.
The 7th Circuit has again left a disappointed creditor with no recourse because of the creditor's failure to do basic investigation or take steps to protect itself. (On Command Video Corporation vs. Samuel J. Roti, Nos. 12-1351 and 12-1430, January 14, 2013). This case follows other cases in which the 7th Circuit has shown itself decidedly unfriendly to creditors who sought compensation through the courts in failed business ventures but could have, but failed, to prevent their unfortunate situation.
When being sued, corporate and individual defendants should always confirm that the plaintiff has not been previously discharged in bankruptcy and failed to disclose the claim in the proceeding as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. In Guay v. Burack, 677 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2012), the plaintiff brought numerous claims against various governmental entities, governmental officials and a police officer.
In a recent decision, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals was faced with a situation that is the bane of any commercial and business attorney. A legal document contained an error. But in this case, the error was so extreme and obvious that the court was willing to reform the document to correct the error, in the face of other cases where courts refused to let parties escape from their mistakes. In re: Equipment Acquisition Resources (7th Cir., No. 1103905 decided on August 9, 2012)