In Aventura2, a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”), the Honourable Justice Penny confirmed that a bankruptcy trustee does not have the authority, pursuant to section 30(1)(k) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”), to disclaim a lease on behalf of a bankrupt landlord. Rather, a trustee’s authority to disclaim a lease is limited to situations where the bankrupt is the tenant.
On October 13, 2015, the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) dismissed the so-called “interest stops rule” appeal in the Nortel matter,[1] thereby confirming that the rule applies in proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”). The Court’s decision also appears to eliminate any suggestion that the rule only applies to so-called “liquidating” CCAA proceedings.
On May 1, 2015, the Alberta Court of Appeal rendered its decision in 1773907 Alberta Ltd. v. Davidson, 2015 ABCA 150, and allowed an appeal permitting an action, brought in the name of an insolvent company, to proceed, notwithstanding that the company had assigned this claim to a third party. As will be discussed, the assignment of an action to a third party is often found to be caught by the doctrines of champerty and maintenance, and the decision by the Court serves to identify where such an assignment will be permitted.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided on Monday, June 1, 2015, that Chapter 7 debtors may not rid themselves of second-mortgage liens in cases where, at the time of the bankruptcy, the first mortgage is undersecured. The decision reverses two Eleventh Circuit rulings that would have made such liens disappear under Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.
A bankruptcy case[1] (no surprise) has produced another instructive court ruling on post-acceleration enforceability of a prepayment (make-whole) premium provision contained in a debt instrument. This latest lesson comes via the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, affirming a ruling of that district’s U.S.
In an opinion issued today, the Supreme Court held that debtors do not have the right to immediately appeal a bankruptcy court’s decision denying confirmation of a proposed reorganization plan. This decision resolves a circuit split, and confirms the balance of power between debtors and creditors in the plan confirmation process. As the Supreme Court explained, “the knowledge that [a debtor] will have no guaranteed appeal from a denial should encourage the debtor to work with creditors and the trustee to develop a confirmable plan as promptly as possible.”
On June 6, 2014, Justice Brown of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) released additional reasons1 to his decision in Romspen Investment Corp. v. 6711162 Canada Inc., 2014 ONSC 2781, centred on the cost submissions made by counsel to Romspen Investment Corp. (“Romspen”). Despite a contractual provision in a mortgage agreement that gave the applicant, Romspen, a right to full indemnity costs from the respondents, Justice Brown found that the legal fees incurred by counsel to Romspen were unreasonable.
Factoring is a common way for businesses to monetize current assets. Typically, in a factoring transaction, an enterprise sells its accounts receivable to a third party (commonly a bank, but not always), which, in exchange for a discount on the value of the receivables, takes on the effort and time commitment related to collecting the accounts.
The recent decision by the Court of Appeal for Ontario (the “Court”) in 306440 Ontario Ltd. v. 782127 Ontario Ltd.1 serves as a cautionary reminder to secured creditors that their position may not always be at the top of the insolvency food chain, even when they have taken all the proper steps to perfect their security interests.
Big Case for UCC Aficionados