Earlier this month, we reported to you on the bipartisan legislation introduced in the Michigan Legislature known as the Nonrecourse Mortgage Loan Act (the “Act”).  

The Act has been approved overwhelmingly by both chambers of the Michigan Legislature and will be presented to the Governor’s office for signature. It is expected that the legislation will be signed into law within the next several business days.  

The common law has long recognized a secured creditor’s duty to provide reasonable notice to borrowers before enforcing its security and appointing a receiver. The practical importance of this has become less significant since the codification of the principle of reasonable notice in section 244 of theBankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”). However, in the recent case of Bank of Montreal v.

According to a U.S. Department of Justice press release, the federal government and 49 state attorneys general have reached a $25 billion settlement agreement with the nation’s five largest mortgage servicers to settle claims over alleged mortgage loan servicing and foreclosure abuses. If reports are correct, the agreement, which Attorney General Holder called the “the largest joint federal-state settlement ever obtained,” compels the mortgage servicers to adhere to extensive new servicing standards and provides considerable financial relief for homeowners.

On January 19, 2012, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in In re River East Plaza, LLC , 2012 WL 169760 (7th Cir. January 19, 2012), affirming an order by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, granting an undersecured creditor's motion to lift the automatic stay and dismissing the debtor's single asset real case. The debtor attempted to defeat the mortgagee's motion to lift the automatic stay by proposing a "cramdown" Chapter 11 plan of reorganization.

In the midst of the ongoing restructurings of Nortel and AbitibiBowater, the New Democrats introduced Bill C-501 in the spring of 2010 to amend the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (the “BIA”) and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) with the goal of better protecting employees’ interests in the context of formal insolvency proceedings, including pension interests. However, Bill C-501 did not become law.

Introduction

In “True Lease v. Security Lease – Is the Distinction Still Relevant?” which appeared in the June 2008 issue of Collateral Matters, Jill Fraser discussed a 2007 amendment to the Personal Property Security Act (Ontario) (the “PPSA”) and whether or not the distinction between a true lease and a security lease was still relevant in light of that amendment.

A promissory note is a one-way undertaking. The maker promises to pay to the payee. There is nothing promised by the payee. The whole point of having a promissory note is to have a document that clearly states an obligation to pay. By contrast, most contracts are bilateral, meaning that each party promises to do something. And those promises are usually mutually dependent: if one party breaches, then the other may be excused from further performance. But that is not the case with a promissory note.

Section 11.01 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) states that no order under Section 11 or 11.02 of the CCAA has the effect of: (a) prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, the use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided after the order is made; or (b) requiring the further advance of money or credit.

As most are aware by now, the Ontario Court of Appeal (the “OCA”) recently caused alarm by finding that claims of pension plan beneficiaries ranked higher than the super-priority debtor-in-possession financing charge (the “DIP Charge”) created by the amended initial order (the “CCAA Order”) in the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) proceedings of the Indalex group of Canadian companies (collectively, “Indalex”).

During the past 14 months, courts in Ontario have rendered three decisions dealing with the application of limitation periods to claims for fraudulent conveyances or preferences. A “limitation period” is a period of time, specified in a statute, within which a plaintiff must commence a court proceeding to seek a remedy. Otherwise, the claim is said to be “statute-barred” and an action to enforce the claim will be dismissed.

The recent decisions have brought some clarity to the law in this area, but have left other questions unanswered.

Background