There are some strict rules which apply when an individual is made bankrupt. Some of them were brought to the fore recently in the case of Floyd Foster v Davenport Lyons (A Firm) in the Chancery Division EWHC 275 (Ch).

The main cardinal rules are:

The recent case of F Options Ltd v Prestwood Properties Ltd concerned the setting aside of a transaction as a preference under section 239 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

A preference arises when a company's creditor is put in a better position than they would otherwise have been in the event of the company's insolvency. Transactions may be a preference whether or not the parties are connected, but where it can be shown that there is a connection within section 249 of the Insolvency Act 1986, two important advantages are gained:

The law allows any person to be treated as a director even though that person has not been formally appointed as a director. Such directors are known as de-facto directors. By contrast, a de jure director is a person who has been validly appointed as a director.

The recent case of Re Snelling House Ltd (In Liquidation) [2012] EWHC 440 (Ch) serves as a useful reminder to consider possible claims against de-facto directors who may be acting under the wrong impression that they are beyond reprehension.

The facts

The long awaited judgment in The Commissioners for her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v. Football League Limited, on the so called “football creditors’ rule” (the “Rule”) has been given.

This article only concerns itself with the issue of whether the Rule was or was not considered void on the grounds that it was contrary to the pari passu principle and the anti-deprivation rule and not on the fairness of the Rule itself.

On May 29, 2012, the United States Supreme Court upheld a secured creditor’s absolute right to credit bid when a debtor files a Chapter 11 plan proposing to sell the secured creditor’s collateral free and clear of the secured creditor’s liens. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. ___ (2012). In just a little over one month since oral argument, the Supreme Court resolved a conflict between two circuit courts of appeal as to whether a plan could prohibit a secured creditor from credit bidding on its collateral at a sale.

On May 15, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that security interests and liens granted by subsidiaries of a borrower to refinance obligations owed to the borrower’s lenders constituted fraudulent transfers under section 548(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code in the borrower’s and subsidiaries’ bankruptcy cases.Senior Transeastern Lenders v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (In re TOUSA, Inc.), 2012 WL 1673910 (11th Cir. 2012).

BESTrustees v Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander [2012] EWHC 629 (Ch) (High Court Chancery Division 16 March 2012)

Background

It is looking increasingly likely that 2012 will be another difficult year for the automotive sector, leading to a decline, not only in vehicle sales, but also in goods and services supplied to the sector. As a result, businesses may experience cash flow problems and increased creditor pressure to pay invoices.

We previously reported on Raithatha v Williamson (4 April 2012) where the High Court held that a bankrupt’s right to draw a pension was subject to an income payments order (“IPO”) even if the individual had yet to draw his pension. This judgment represented a significant departure from previous practice under the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 which protected future pension rights from IPOs and distinguished them from pensions in payment. It also effectively allowed a trustee in bankruptcy to compel a bankrupt to draw pension against his wishes.

On May 11, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued a decision in BMD Contractors, Inc. v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (No. 11-1345), affirming a lower court summary judgment in favor of a surety on a payment bond.