On Oct. 27, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that even inadvertent mistakes in UCC filings count – the burden rests on the filing party to detect errors, and not on affected parties who come across them in a search. This ruling upsets the 2013 decision of the bankruptcy court and will ultimately determine the character of a $1.5 billion security interest in the General Motors (GM) bankruptcy.
Background
Bankruptcy and insolvency professionals should take note of two recent Ontario Superior Court decisions that put professional fees in the spotlight. TNG Acquisition Inc. (Re), 2014 ONSC 2754 [Commercial List] (“TNG Acquisition”) and Bank of Nova Scotia v. Diemer, 2014 ONSC 365 (“Diemer”), saw Brown J. and Goodman J., respectively, reduce fees for court-appointed officers and their legal counsel on the basis that the amounts sought were unreasonable in consideration of the work performed.
In its June 11, 2014 decision in Iona Contractors Ltd. (Re), 2014 ABQB 347 (“Iona Contractors”), the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta (the “Alberta QB”) held that the trust created by section 22 of the Builders’ Lien Act (Alberta) is not effective in the bankruptcy of a would-be trustee debtor. This result is consistent with, but reached completely independently of, the recent Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) decision in Royal Bank of Canada v. Atlas Block Co.
As bankruptcy practitioners will recall, the Supreme Court held in Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S., 131 S.Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) that bankruptcy courts, as non-Article III courts, “lack[] the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim,” even though Congress had classified these types of proceedings as core – and thus authorized federal bankruptcy courts to hear and decide them.
In his recent decision inRoyal Bank of Canada v.Atlas Block Co. Limited, 2014 ONSC 3062 (“Atlas Block”), Justice Penny of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) held that trust claims pursuant to section 8 of the Construction Lien Act (Ontario) (the “CLA”) do not survive the bankruptcy of the would-be trustee debtor.
In 2014, the Chilean Legislature enacted legislation that substantially overhauls its prior insolvency law, liberalizing that law as it pertains to business insolvency cases commenced in Chile. As explained below, this new law incorporates a number of provisions that permit the reorganization of financially troubled businesses.
On December 19, 2013, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (the “RMV”) cannot deny vehicle permits to individuals on account of pre- bankruptcy debts owing to the ETR Concession Company Limited (the “ETR”). Based on the intent and purpose of federal bankruptcy law to permit debtors to obtain a “fresh start,” it was concluded that the provincial act establishing the ETR conflicts with bankruptcy law and was, as a result, unconstitutional in part.
Background
A lingering misperception among American businesspersons and some commercial lawyers is that it is a fool’s errand to commence an insolvency case seeking reorganization in a European nation because those national laws prescribe liquidation rather than rehabilitation. These business leaders often dismiss out-of-hand insolvency relief on the continent for a troubled European subsidiary and elect to wind up the company’s affairs outside the judicial system.
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently limited the ability of a secured creditor to credit bid for substantially all of the debtors’ assets because (i) the credit bid would chill, or even freeze, the bidding process, (ii) the proposed expedited private sale pursuant to a credit bid would be inconsistent with notions of fairness in the bankruptcy process, and (iii) the amount of the secured claim was uncertain. In re Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., Case No. 13-13087 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 17, 2014).
Section 1111(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) is one of its least understood provisions, primarily due to its somewhat opaque language. This Code subsection is divided into two distinct but related parts. The first part, section 1111(b)(1), provides that a nonrecourse secured claim in a Chapter 11 case will be treated “as if such holder had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such holder has such recourse” subject to two exceptions.