In Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Old Cold LLC (In re Old Cold LLC), 879 F.3d 376 (1st Cir. 2018), the First Circuit held that a sale in possible violation of the Supreme Court’s Jevic decision does not allow an appellate court to examine the merits of the sale when the sale-approval order otherwise is statutorily moot under section 363(m).

Encrypted digital currencies (“cryptocurrencies”),1 particularly Bitcoin, have recently become the target of enormous international speculation and market scrutiny. Some expect cryptocurrency payments and other transactions tracked via distributed ledger technology (“DLT”, of which “blockchain” technology is one example) to be the future of commercial interaction. The theory is that cryptocurrencies could become “the holy grail of commerce – a payment system that would eliminate or minimize the roles of third party intermediaries.”2

An equipment finance company finances the purchase of a truck and registers a purchase-money security interest (a “PMSI”) pursuant to the Personal Property Security Act (Ontario) (the “PPSA”) to protect its interest. The truck breaks down and is taken in for repairs. While the truck is in the shop, the debtor defaults under its lending arrangements with the equipment finance company.

In a January 31, 2018 decision from the bench in the matter of Royal Bank of Canada v. A-1 Asphalt Maintenance Ltd. (Court File No. CV-14-10784-00CL) (“A-1 Asphalt”), Madam Justice Conway of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) held that the deemed trust provisions of subsection 8(1)(a) of the Construction Lien Act (Ontario) (the “CLA”) were not, on their own, sufficient to create a trust recognized in a contractor’s bankruptcy or proposal proceedings.

Until a court orders otherwise, a monitor appointed under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act is a neutral party and may not take sides in favour of one stakeholder over another.

Delaware District Judge Leonard P. Stark has seemingly split with the Second Circuit and held that the safe harbor in Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not bar fraudulent transfer claims brought on behalf of creditors under state law, ratifying a June 2016 opinion from Delaware Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Gross.

In bankruptcy, one of the “powers” granted to a trustee is the ability to undo previously completed transactions in order to facilitate payments to creditors. However, the Bankruptcy Code prevents a trustee from unwinding certain types of transactions. The safe harbor provision of 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) protects financial institutions performing securities transactions from having to disgorge payments initially made by a now bankrupt company.

Fourth Circuit Authorizes Partial Dirt for Debt Plan

The Bankruptcy Code requires that secured creditors realize the indubitable equivalent of their claims as a condition to confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization. In the case of Bate Land & Timber LLC, the Fourth Circuit addressed indubitable equivalence in the context of a partial dirt for debt plan where the debtor planned to covey several tracks of real property in partial satisfaction of its obligations to its secured creditor and pay the remaining balance owed in cash.

The Bankruptcy Protector

Back in September, the Bankruptcy Protector announced that was introducing a new periodic series: theJevic Files. As promised, we have published intermittent updates identifying cases where Jevic priority skipping issues are raised and adjudicated.

In this post, we attempt to provide a succinct summary of all cases decided post-Jevic.

How Courts Are Applying Jevic

Creditors should take note that the deadline for filing a proof of claim has changed in bankruptcy cases filed under chapter 7, chapter 12 or chapter 13. As of December 1, 2017, a proof of claim ordinarily must be filed not later than 70 days after the bankruptcy case is filed if the case is voluntarily filed under one of these chapters. The change in deadlines is one of many recent changes to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.