There is little doubt that even the most thought-out, meticulous and well-structured business rescue plan cannot succeed unless there is some degree of financial support in the form of post-commencement finance (PCF) available, to allow the business to sail through the choppy waters of financial distress.

A bankruptcy court’s asset sale order limiting specific pre-bankruptcy product liability claims required prior “actual or direct mail notice” to claimants when the debtor “knew or reasonably should have known about the claims,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on July 13, 2016. In re Motors Liquidation Co., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12848, *46-47 (2d Cir. July 13, 2016).

In Umso Construction (Pty) Ltd v Member of the Executive Council for Roads and Public Works Eastern Cape Province and Others ((20800/2014) [2016] ZASCA 61), the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the legal position where, following the award of a tender, it is discovered that the preferred bidder had been placed under business rescue during the bid evaluation process.

An individual Chapter 11 debtor’s “estate was diminishing” with no “reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on July 5, 2016. In re Hoover, 2016 WL 3606918, *2 (1st Cir. July 5, 2016), affirming the bankruptcy court’s conversion of the case to a Chapter 7 liquidation. In a rare appellate decision on the conversion issue, the First Circuit affirmed the finding that the debtor had sold “inventory without replacing it with new inventory or retaining cash sufficient to offset the diminution.” Id. at *3.

A lender’s (“Lender”) derivative breach of fiduciary duty claims on behalf of Chapter 7 guarantor-Debtors cannot be time-barred because of Lender’s knowledge of the “[d]efendants’ conduct,” held the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware on June 22, 2016. In re AMC Investors, LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80861, *16 (Del. June 22, 2016).

In Roering & Another NNO v Mahlangu (581/2015) [2016] ZASCA 79 heard recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) considered the circumstances that might justify a witness under subpoena applying for enquiry proceedings to be set aside or for the witness to be excused from attending those proceedings.

The general rule is that a subpoenaed witness is compelled to attend, subject to procedural requirements being met, and the evidence sought being relevant to the insolvent company or entity.

A debtor’s pre-bankruptcy repurchase of its stock for $150 million was not a fraudulent transfer because the debtor “could have sold off enough of its assets or alternatively obtained sufficient credit to continue its business for the foreseeable future,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on June 15, 2016. In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 2016 WL3315847, *2 (2d Cir. June 15, 2016). Affirming the lower courts, the Second Circuit stressed that “the issue of adequate capitalization,” the “sole issue presented on appeal ...

In the recent case of Constantia Insurance Company Limited v Master of the High Court, Johannesburg (23968/2015) [2016] ZAGPJHC 121 the High Court considered whether the provisions of the Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936 (Act) permit the Master to consider liquidators’ additional submissions in response to a creditor’s substantiation of its claim.

The Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in Swart v Starbuck & Others 2016 ZASCA 83, reaffirmed the necessary authorisation for a trustee of an insolvent estate to sell an insolvent estate’s immovable property.

Mr Swart’s estate was finally sequestrated on 1 November 2005. On 24 January 2006, three provisional trustees were appointed by the Master of the High Court. At the time of Mr Swart’s provisional sequestration, he owned certain immovable properties (Properties).

“Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act is barred by § 903(1) … of the Bankruptcy Code,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on June 13, 2016. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 2016 WL 3221517, *11 (U.S. June 13, 2016) (5-2). Affirming the First Circuit, the court reasoned that Code § 903(i) “preempts state bankruptcy laws [enabling] insolvent municipalities to restructure their debts over the objections of creditors [and] instead requires municipalities to restructure [their] debts under Chapter 9 of the Code.” Id., at *2.