On April 24, 2017, in Orphan Well Association v.Grant Thornton Limited, the Alberta Court of Appeal (Court) upheld Chief Justice N.

La Cour du Banc de la Reine de l’Alberta (la « Cour ») a clarifié la façon dont seront traitées les demandes en cas d’abus dans le cadre de procédures en vertu de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies (la « LACC »). Dans sa décision récente concernant l’affaire Lightstream Resources Ltd.

“[C]ourts may account for hypothetical preference actions within a hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation” to hold a defendant bank (“Bank”) liable for a payment it received within 90 days of a debtor’s bankruptcy, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2017.In re Tenderloin Health, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4008, *4 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017).

The Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench (Court) has provided clarity on how oppression claims will be adjudicated in the context of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). In the recent decision in Lightstream Resources Ltd. (Re), the Court confirmed that it has jurisdiction to hear oppression claims, but held that the exercise of this discretion is limited to appropriate circumstances.

A defendant bank (“Bank”) in a fraudulent transfer suit “could not prove” its “good faith” defense for loan repayments it received after its “investigator discovered [the] fraudulent past” of the Ponzi scheme debtor’s principal but “failed to disclose that past to [the Bank’s account] manager,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on Feb. 8, 2017. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2248, *28 (6th Cir. Feb. 8, 2017).

On Jan. 17, 2017, in a closely watched dispute surrounding Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp. (the “Decision”).[1] In a 2-1 ruling reversing the District Court,[2] the Court of Appeals construed Section 316(b) narrowly, holding that it only prohibits “non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms” and does not protect noteholders’ practical ability to receive payment.[3]

“Transaction fees are part of the standard, negotiated base compensation for the investment banker,” held the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on Dec. 16, 2016. In re Relativity Fashion, LLC, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 4339, *10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2016) (Wiles, B.J.). The court denied objections to the transaction fees sought by two investment bankers, P and H, ruling that the objecting parties (a fee examiner, the debtor and a secured lender) had no right under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 328(a) to challenge the transaction fees. Id. at *25.

An undersecured mortgagee’s “release of [its entire underlying claim] was value obtained ‘in exchange for’ the [pre-bankruptcy] sale of the [debtor’s] property,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on Dec. 6, 2016. In re Expert South Tulsa LLC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21704, at *11 (10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2016). The Tenth Circuit flatly rejected the debtor’s attempt “to set aside as a fraudulent transfer its own sale of real estate that was encumbered by a mortgage far exceeding the sale price.” Id. at *1.

The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Bankruptcy Rules”) require each corporate party in an adversary proceeding (i.e., a bankruptcy court suit) to file a statement identifying the holders of “10% or more” of the party’s equity interests. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7007.1(a). Bankruptcy Judge Martin Glenn, relying on another local Bankruptcy Rule (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. R.

“Any ... suit [against creditors’ committee members for their official acts] must be brought in the bankruptcy court, or in another court only with the express permission of the bankruptcy court,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 28, 2016. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club LLC, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21187, *9 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016).