In the recent judgment of the ECSC in the matter of Sumner Group Mining Limited v Zica S.A (BVIHC (Com) 2020/0171, Walkers successfully represented the respondent in defending an application to set aside a statutory demand. Jack J provided helpful guidance on the legal principles in circumstances where it is alleged that a statutory demand had been served improperly for a collateral purpose.
The applicant sought to set aside a statutory demand on the basis of either:
The Grand Court of the Cayman Islands (the "Court") recently handed down a decision in the case of BDO Cayman Ltd. and BDO Trinity Ltd. v Ardent Harmony Fund Inc. (In Official Liquidation). This case provides helpful guidance on the exercise of the Court's discretion to grant leave to commence proceedings against a company in liquidation.
Background
Practical Effects Of Significant Reforms To Guernsey’s Insolvency Law With reference to practical examples from England & Wales, this briefing note seeks to highlight three areas of change that will be of particular interest to Insolvency Practitioners, directors involved with Guernsey companies and their professional advisors once the Companies (Guernsey) Law, 2008 (Insolvency) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2020 (the “Ordinance”) comes into force. Enhanced Investigatory Powers The Ordinance extends insolvency professionals’ powers in four important respects.
A lender’s state law tort claims against “non-debtor third-parties for tortious interference with a contract” were “not preempted” by “federal bankruptcy law,” held the New York Court of Appeals on Nov. 24, 2020. Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky, 2020 WL 6875979, *1 (N.Y. Ct. Appeals, Nov. 24, 2020) (4-3). In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of a lender’s complaint against the debtors’ non-debtor insiders. The lender will still have to prove its case at trial.
The Asserted Claims
In a recent decision of the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands (the “Grand Court”) in the matter of Sun Cheong Creative Development Holdings Limited (FSD 160 of 2020), the Chief Justice considered the principles applicable to the appointment of “soft touch” provisional liquidators to effect the restructuring of a Hong Kong-listed Cayman Islands company where two competing winding up petitions were filed before the High Court of Hong Kong (the ("HK Petitions" and the “HK Court” respectively).
On 29 September 2020, Chief Justice Smellie QC handed down his judgment in the Matter of Premier Assurance Group SPC Ltd (in Controllership) (FSD Cause No. 210 of 2020) confirming the powers of the controllers appointed under section 24(2)(h) of the Insurance Law, 2010 (the "Insurance Law") so as to enable them to exercise their powers as against the "world at large". In doing so, the Chief Justice held that the Court has an inherent jurisdiction to supplement section 24 of the Insurance Law to "fill the practical gap" left by that provision.
Background
In a decision of first impression entered on June 3, 2020, a Chicago bankruptcy court (“Court”) held that a restaurant tenant was excused from paying a significant portion of its rent under the force majeure provisions of its lease because of the governor’s executive order prohibiting in-house dining during the COVID-19 pandemic.[1] This decision is highly significant for landlords and tenants whose ability to service their clients has similarly been restricted by government orders.
The bankruptcy trustee of a bank holding company was not entitled to a consolidated corporate tax refund when a bank subsidiary had incurred losses generating the refund, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on May 26, 2020. Rodriguez v. FDIC (In re United Western Bancorp, Inc.), 2020 WL 2702425(10th Cir May 26, 2020). On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit, as directed, applied “Colorado law to resolve” the question of “who owns the federal tax refund.” Id., at *2.
A bankruptcy court’s preliminary injunction was “not a final and immediately appealable order,” held the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware on Dec. 10, 2019. In re Alcor Energy, LLC, 2019 WL 6716420, 4 (D. Del. Dec. 10, 2019). The court declined to “exercise [its] discretion” under 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3) to hear the interlocutory appeal. Id., citing 16 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, §3926.1 (3d ed. 2017) (“There is no provision for appeal as of right from an injunction order of a bankruptcy judge to the district court.”).
A creditor’s “later-in-time reclamation demand is ‘subject to’ [a lender’s] prior rights as a secured creditor,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Feb. 11, 2020. In re HHGregg, Inc., 2020 WL 628268 (7th Cir. Feb. 11, 2020). And “[w]hen a lender insists on collateral, it expects the collateral to be worth something,” said the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on Feb. 11, 2020, when rejecting a guarantor’s “novel reading” of his security agreement. In re Somerset Regional Water Resources, LLC, 2020 WL 628542 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 2020).