Judge Drain’s recent decision confirming the Momentive Performance Materials Inc. plan is just the latest in a series of recent cases involving “make whole” premiums. As in several of the recent cases, the lenders lost because the contract did not clearly enough provide for the make whole premium in the event of an acceleration rather than prepayment.
Many indentures contain “make-whole provisions,” which protect a noteholder’s right to receive bargained-for interest payments by requiring compensation for lost interest when accrued principal and interest are paid early. Make-whole provisions permit a borrower to redeem or repay notes before maturity, but require the borrower to make a payment that is calculated to compensate noteholders for a loss of expected interest payments.
A bankruptcy court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to determine a tax refund claim under Section 505(a)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code where the refund was requested by a liquidating trustee appointed pursuant to a plan, as opposed to a pre-confirmation bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-possession, the Second Circuit held in United States v. Bond, Docket No. 12-4803 (2nd Cir. Aug. 13, 2014).
In an opinion filed on July 3, 2014, in the case of In re Lower Bucks Hospital, et al., Case No. 10-10239 (ELF), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Third Circuit) affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Bankruptcy Court), which denied approval of third-party releases benefitting The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, N.A., in its capacity as indenture trustee (BNYM, or the Trustee).
On May 28, 2014, the District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed an order from the bankruptcy court in Dishi & Sons v. Bay Condos LLC, et al.1, approving a sale of the Debtor’s assets, but found that the Debtor’s commercial tenant was entitled to remain in possession of the premises for the remainder of the lease at the specified rent.
In 2011, the US Supreme Court issued its landmark decision in Stern v. Marshall. Turning decades of bankruptcy practice on its head, the Supreme Court held that, even though bankruptcy courts are statutorily authorized to enter final judgments in “core” matters, Article III of the Constitution prohibits them from finally adjudicating certain core matters, such as a debtor’s state law counterclaim against a creditor (so-called “Stern claims”).
Often times indenture trustees seek to sit on creditors committees in furtherance of their fiduciary duties to holders. Obviously, the professional fees and expenses can be paid as a first priority pursuant to a charging lien as provided for under the indenture documents. The payment of such fees and expenses becomes an issue, however, when there are no plan distributions to holders or the plan distributions are illiquid or non-cash.
Hopes that certain severance payments paid by companies to terminated employees could escape application of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) tax were dashed when a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court ruled on March 25th that such payments, when not tied to state unemployment benefits, were “wages,” and thus taxable. The ruling for the government will allow the IRS to disallow protective refund claims that numerous companies filed after a federal circuit court held that termination payments were not subject to FICA tax.
On March 4, 2014, a unanimous United States Supreme Court decided Law v. Siegel1 and clarified that exercising statutory or inherent powers, a bankruptcy court may not contravene specific statutory authority. Law will likely have broad implications for business bankruptcy cases even though it directly involved the exercise of a bankruptcy judge’s authority under section 105(a) to create a pragmatic solution to the actions of a bad actor in a consumer bankruptcy case.
A recent decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has added an additional eligibility requirement for the filing of Chapter 15 cases. In Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 6482499 (2d Cir.