The UK Government has long been considering significant reforms of the UK’s insolvency framework, even before the advent of COVID-19. The pandemic resulted in the acceleration of those reforms and the passing of the new Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (the “Act”), which came into force in June.
Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).
Everyone, including the least empathic in our society (aka, lawyers), knows that we should seek to uphold the golden rule and “do unto others…” with respect to family, friends, and acquaintances, but does this also apply in the corporate world? Apparently so, as a Delaware bankruptcy court just ruled that preferred shareholders with a bankruptcy-filing blocking right (also known as a “Golden Share”) must consider the effects on other shareholders and all other creditors when exercising such right.
Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.
No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.
Background
On 2 June 2020, Mr Justice Morgan handed down his judgment in the case of Re: A Company [2020] EWHC 1406 (Ch) in which a High Street retailer (whose identity is not disclosed) applied to restrain the presentation of a winding-up petition based on the provisions of the yet-to-be-enacted Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill 2020 (the “Bill”).
It is well established that by filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy, a creditor submits itself to the equitable jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and waives any right it would otherwise have to a jury trial with respect to any issue that “bears directly on the allowance of its claim.” Such a waiver normally applies in fraudulent transfer actions, since under Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code the court must disallow a claim of any entity that received an avoidable transfer.
One of the pleasures of life is re-encountering old friends, catching up on what’s happened while your lives have gone their separate ways, reminiscing about the good old days and reconnecting. It comes back so fast, it’s like you never were apart.
Me and the Liquidating Trust had just such an experience the other day.
The Government published its Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill on 20 May 2020, which will implement the most significant reform to the UK’s insolvency framework in decades. In addition to permanent landmark changes, including introducing a business rescue moratorium and new restructuring plan, the Bill contains a number of temporary measures to help businesses respond to the COVID-19 crisis.
In a recent bench ruling, the Delaware bankruptcy court denied a motion to dismiss a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, notwithstanding the fact that the filing contravened an express bankruptcy-filing blocking right, or “golden share,” held by certain preferred shareholders.