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Trillions of dollars of securities are issued on the strength of bankruptcy remoteness and special purpose entities (“SPVs”) intended to be bankruptcy remote. These transactions generally involve hundreds of millions of dollars and investors’ expectations that the SPVs will not be dragged into a potential bankruptcy filing of their non-SPV affiliates.

Once again, a bankruptcy court has weighed in on the subject of discharging student loan debt in the context of a chapter 7 proceeding.

In a recent opinion, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland dealt with a conflict between the strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements and the Bankruptcy Code’s emphasis on centralization of claims. Based on an analysis of the two statutory schemes and their underlying policies and concerns, the Court decided to lift the automatic stay to allow the prepetition arbitration proceeding to go forward with respect to non-core claims.

Background

On 28 June 2021, the English High Court handed down a judgment declining to sanction a restructuring plan proposed by Hurricane Energy PLC, which sought to cram down the dissenting class of shareholders and hand over the control of the company to its bondholders with a debt-for-equity swap diluting the shareholders down to 5% of their existing shareholding. This is the first time that the English court has declined to sanction a restructuring plan (since their introduction almost a year ago in June 2020), and only the fourth time that the cross-class cram down mechanism has been used.

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico added its voice to the split in judicial authority on whether a lien or similar transfer can be avoided under sections 544, 547, 548 and 549 of the Bankruptcy Code where only the debtor itself may benefit from the avoidance. Judge Thuma in his recent decision in U.S. Glove, Inc. v. Jacobs (In re U.S. Glove, Inc.), AP No. 21-1009, 2021 WL 2405399 (Bankr. D. N.M.

The application of sovereign immunity principles in bankruptcy cases has vexed the courts for decades. The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions on the matter have not helped much. Although they have addressed the issue in specific contexts, they have not established clear guidelines that the lower courts may apply more generally. The Third Circuit took a crack at clarifying this muddy but important area of the law in the case of Venoco LLC (with its affiliated debtors, the “Debtors”).

Background

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas recently clarified the administrative expense standard applicable to indenture trustees by holding that they can recover fees and expenses as administrative expenses only when they make a “substantial contribution.” This standard requires a greater showing than “benefit to the estate,” which is the general administrative expense standard. In re Sanchez Energy Corp., No. 19-34508 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 3, 2021).

Background

Turns out, it depends on who you ask. Judge Bernstein said no. Recently, Judge Glenn said yes, but only for causes of action that resemble actual fraudulent transfers. It is unusual for the bankruptcy judges in Manhattan to disagree with each other, so let’s take a look at the issue.

Background

The automatic stay provided under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code is an injunction, arising when a bankruptcy case is filed, which prevents all proceedings or actions against the debtor or the property of the estate without court permission - the so-called “lifting of the stay”.[1]