Since 1956, legislation has required suretyship agreements to be embodied in a written document. A suretyship agreement involves three parties; simplistically if A does not pay B, then C will. C will step into the shoes of A and perform A’s obligations for them.
The introduction of business rescue proceedings by Chapter 6 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) created uncertainty on various levels, in particular the extent and nature of certain rights previously enjoyed by creditors.
Our courts are making progress in finding a path through the muddy waters in this regard and every day a judgment is delivered that sheds some light on previous uncertain propositions.
In order to file for bankruptcy in the United States, a company needs to secure the appropriate corporate authorizations as required by its governing documents. What happens when a debtor does not obtain appropriate authorization to file its bankruptcy case? Recently, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of West Virginia held in In re Tara Retail Group, LLC that an improper bankruptcy filing can be ratified when those who are required to authorize the filing remain silent.
Background
U.S. courts generally agree that the substantive consolidation should be applied sparingly, and even more so when substantive consolidation of debtors with non-debtors is sought. While many opinions address the grounds for substantive consolidation, very few cases address standing and notice issues when the sought for consolidation is of non-debtor entities. The Oklahoma bankruptcy court recently addressed these two issues in SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Stewart.
In the case of First Rand Bank Limited v KJ Foods CC (in business rescue) (734/2015) [2015] ZA SCA 50 (26 April 2017), the main issue that the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) had to determine was whether the High Court of Pretoria (Court a quo) was correct in setting aside a vote by the appellant, FirstRand Bank Limited (FNB), against the adoption of a business rescue plan (plan) on the basis that it was reasonable and just to do so in terms of s153(7) of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act).
Under section 1111(b) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a non-recourse secured creditor that holds “a claim secured by a lien on property of the estate” is granted recourse against the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. But what happens when there has been a post-petition foreclosure on such property, so that it is no longer part of the estate and the liens have been extinguished? Can the creditor still use section 1111(b) to assert a claim against the bankruptcy estate? The Ninth Circuit answered no in Matsan v.
BUSINESS RESCUE, RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY: THE COURT’S POWER TO SET ASIDE THE DISSENTING VOTE OF A CREDITOR IN BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS If satisfied that it is reasonable and just to do so, a court may set aside a dissenting vote on a business rescue plan. In Collard v Jatara Connect (Pty) Ltd & Others [2017] ZAWCHC 45, the court did exactly that. Explaining his decision, Judge Dlodlo stated that there should be no reason to prefer a winding up application over a business rescue plan that will pay the employees of the company in full and result in a better return for creditors.
Recent Developments in Acquisition Finance
A U.S. House of Representatives Bill would amend the Bankruptcy Code to establish new provisions to address the special issues raised by troubled nonbank financial institutions.
In a highly anticipated bankruptcy opinion, the United States Supreme Court, in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., held that courts may not approve structured dismissals providing for distributions that deviate from the priority rules prescribed in the Bankruptcy Code, absent consent of the affected creditors.