A recent decision out of the District Court for the Southern District of New York may bring greater certainty to the interpretation of what constitutes a “financial institution” in connection with the safe harbor in section 546(e) of the bankruptcy code. The decision, In re Tribune Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 69081 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.

Merit Management

Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky et al., is a New York case which gets to the heart of the enforceability of classic single-purpose entity restrictions in commercial real estate lending. At issue is how far a third-party may go to cause a violation of a borrower’s SPE covenants, and whether those covenants are enforceable at all.

A Defaulted Construction Loan and Frustrated Attempts to Foreclose:

In Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a question that vexed the lower courts and resulted in a circuit split: does the rejection by a debtor-licensor of a trademark license agreement terminate the licensee’s rights under the rejected license?

The default setting for the hearing of many contested debt recovery and security enforcement cases is by way of affidavit evidence, particularly in the High Court[1]. The creditor swears an affidavit setting out the reasons why it maintains the court should rule in its favour. Certain documents can be presented as exhibits that back up its case such as a contract.

It is now well documented that many owners’ management companies are facing the prospect of litigating to recover the cost of remedial works for defective developments or passing the cost onto the owners themselves. Given the passage of time since the construction of the developments and the insolvency of many of the developers and contractors involved in those projects following the financial crisis, management companies often face an uphill battle to recover damages.

The appointment of a receiver by way of equitable execution has generally been considered a “remedy of last resort”[1] and, for over a hundred years, courts have expressed differing views as to when they could appoint such a receiver.

It is a well-established principle of bankruptcy law that claims generally crystallize as of the bankruptcy petition date. Of course, section 506(b) of the bankruptcy code allows over-secured, secured creditors to recover post-petition interest and costs, including reasonable legal fees, if their documentation provides them with the right to recover these costs. But what about unsecured creditors – are post-petition legal fees incurred by an unsecured creditor whose contract with the debtor provides for reimbursement of legal fees allowed or not?

Last year, a California Bankruptcy Court wiped out $10.2 million in default interest (“DRI”) when it ruled that a 5% DRI was an unenforceable penalty in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case where the construction lender fully recovered principal, interest, and other costs of collection.

Bankruptcy Rule 2004 allows the examination of any entity with respect to various topics, including conduct and financial condition of the debtor and any matter that may affect the administration of the estate. Does a subordination agreement that is silent on the use of Rule 2004 prevent the subordinated creditor from taking a Rule 2004 examination of the senior creditor? Yes, says an Illinois bankruptcy court.