From time to time the statutory rights available to parties to construction contracts appears to come into conflict with other sets of provisions that also claim to govern the same areas of dispute. Perhaps the best known such clash, between adjudication and the effect of insolvency, was that explored in the Scottish case of Melville Dundas Limited (in Receivership) v George Wimpey UK Limited[1] in 2007.

The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware recently held in In re Woodbridge Group of Companies, LLC that while Rule 3001 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism for transfers of claims, Rule 3001 is not a substantive provision allowing claims trading for notes with legally valid anti-assignment provisions.

Background

The recent decision of the London Commercial Court in PJSC Tatneft v Gennady Bogolyubov & Ors [2018] EWHC 1314 (Comm) highlights the importance that the Court will attach to full asset disclosure by a respondent to ensure the effectiveness of a freezing order, even in circumstances where the value of a respondent’s assets exceeds the sum frozen by the order.

Freezing Orders: What Are They?

In the recent decision in Carlos Sevilleja Garcia v Marex Financial Limited,1 the Court of Appeal helpfully summarised the justifications for the English law rule against claims for reflective loss and confirmed that the rule applies equally to unsecured creditors of a company as it does to shareholders.

Highlights

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded an Oregon bankruptcy court’s order designating recently acquired claims of a secured creditor for bad faith, holding that a bad faith finding requires “something more.” Specifically, the Court found that a bankruptcy court may not designate claims for bad faith simply because (1) a creditor offers to purchase only a subset of available claims in order to block a plan of reorganization, and/or (2) blocking the plan will adversely impact the remaining creditors.Pacific Western Bank, et al. v.

On 17 December 2015, the Ministry of Justice made a final decision to end the Insolvency Litigation exemption from the 2012 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act (LAPSO) (see

Are Trademark Licenses Protected in Bankruptcy? The Confusion Continues

Recently, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut held that while a bankrupt licensor may reject a trademark licensing agreement, the trademark licensee may elect to retain its rights to the debtor’s trademark. The Bankruptcy Court noted that its ruling disagrees with a contrary decision issued by the First Circuit only a few months earlier.

Executory Contracts and the IP Exception

Recently, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut held that while a bankrupt licensor may reject a trademark licensing agreement, the trademark licensee may elect to retain its rights to the debtor’s trademark. The Bankruptcy Court noted that its ruling disagrees with a contrary decision issued by the First Circuit only a few months earlier.

Executory Contracts and the IP Exception

In May 2018, Mothercare and Carluccio's became the latest in an increasingly long line of high street names to propose Company Voluntary Arrangements (CVAs) involving significant site closures and rent reductions. On 31 May, 91% of unsecured creditors approved the Carluccio's CVA, and the following day Mothercare's creditors followed suit (although that was not the case with all of its subsidiaries, as discussed below). Next in line according to recent reports are House of Fraser and then Homebase, following the latter's acquisition for £1 by retail restructuring specialists Hilco.

Is a foreign online customer of a bankrupt goods supplier subject to personal jurisdiction in the United States, when sued by a bankruptcy trustee for fraudulent transfers? Yes, says the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California in In re Fox Ortega Enterprises, Inc. Debtor. Michael Kasolas, Chapter 7 Tr., Plaintiff, v. Johnny Yau, Defendant., No. 16-40050, 2018 WL 2191597 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 11, 2018).

Legal and Factual Background