When a majority of a company’s board approves a tender offer in good faith, can it still be avoided as an actually fraudulent transfer? Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, holding that the fraudulent intent of a corporation’s CEO who was a board member and exercised control over the board can be imputed to the corporation, even if he was the sole actor with fraudulent intent.

Background

On the 19th of August 2021, the English High Court sanctioned a Part 26A restructuring plan proposed by the administrators of Amicus Finance plc (in administration) (“Amicus”) for the company’s solvent exit from administration, enabling the company to be rescued as a going concern (the “Restructuring Plan”).

After Energy Future Holdings (EFH), maybe not so much. The size of the break-up fee approved by the bankruptcy court in EFH was undoubtedly large by any account – US$275 million. But it was approved following all necessary filings, notice and hearings. All parties and counsel involved were highly sophisticated and experienced. The court that approved the fee was the Delaware bankruptcy court, by all accounts one of the most experienced and sophisticated bankruptcy courts in the nation. And there wasn’t even a hint of fraud, misrepresentation or failure to disclose material facts.

A recent Delaware bankruptcy court decision may potentially place at risk an equity sponsor’s ability to retain proceeds from the sale of a portfolio company whose performance later deteriorates, where the selling sponsor acted in bad faith and the portfolio company was or became insolvent at the time of or on account of the sale.

Circuit Break? Delaware Bankruptcy Court Rejects Second Circuit Ruling on State Law Fraudulent Transfers

Private equity sponsors should be aware of two recent court decisions. One involves fiduciary duties under state law that may be owing to a limited liability company borrower by its managers, in the context of receivables financing facilities or other asset-based lending transactions involving the use of special-purpose vehicles. The other involves certain implications of governing-law choices under acquisition financing and related agreements.

Pottawattamie: Maybe Not So Special (Purpose) After All

Two recent court decisions may affect an equity sponsor’s options when deciding whether and how to put money into - or take money out of - a portfolio company. The first may expand the scope of “inequitable conduct” that, in certain Chapter 11 settings, could lead a court to equitably subordinate a loan made by a sponsor to its portfolio company, placing the loan behind all of the company’s other debt in the payment queue. The second decision muddies the waters of precedent under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code on the issue of the avoidability of non-U.S.

Two recent court decisions may result in a broadening of the range of options available to an equity sponsor in respect of an insolvent portfolio company. The first decision may provide increased flexibility in structuring asset sales in certain chapter 11 settings, by utilizing escrows and other techniques to potentially avoid the need to apply asset-sale proceeds strictly in accordance with creditor priorities under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.

When a portfolio company underperforms, a sponsor may consider various options to address the perceived performance issues, including changes to a portfolio company’s management team, cost structure, capital structure or other parameters, depending on the nature of the issue(s) at hand. When changes in capital structure may be desirable, often in the context of excessive debt and related liquidity issues, a sponsor’s choices may include a consensual workout outside of bankruptcy, or a court-supervised restructuring under Chapter 11 of the U.S.

As is well known, the right to credit bid is the entitlement of a secured lender to bid the amount of its outstanding claims at the sale of its collateral. If the secured lender places the winning bid, no money is exchanged and the purchase price is offset against the existing claims. Credit bidding provides an important right to secured lenders in ensuring that their collateral is not sold for a depressed value. If a secured lender thinks its collateral is being sold too cheaply, it has the option of taking the collateral in exchange for some or all its claims.

There have been some important recent legal developments that will likely impact acquisition finance. This article will survey some of the more notable ones.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, on May 15, 2012, overturned1 a prior District Court decision stemming from the bankruptcy case of Tousa, Inc., affirming a bankruptcy court’s earlier 2009 decision that had ordered the return, on fraudulent transfer grounds, of over $400 million that had been repaid to prior lenders of the Tousa parent company in connection with a secured financing to the parent and its subsidiaries.