Fulltext Search

Trillions of dollars of securities are issued on the strength of bankruptcy remoteness and special purpose entities (“SPVs”) intended to be bankruptcy remote. These transactions generally involve hundreds of millions of dollars and investors’ expectations that the SPVs will not be dragged into a potential bankruptcy filing of their non-SPV affiliates.

Amicus Finance PLC

After a somewhat stop/start convening hearing concluded earlier this month, Amicus Finance PLC (in administration) was the first company given the opportunity to convene creditor meetings for a restructuring plan whilst in administration.

In a recent opinion, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland dealt with a conflict between the strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements and the Bankruptcy Code’s emphasis on centralization of claims. Based on an analysis of the two statutory schemes and their underlying policies and concerns, the Court decided to lift the automatic stay to allow the prepetition arbitration proceeding to go forward with respect to non-core claims.

Background

On 28 June 2021, the English High Court handed down a judgment declining to sanction a restructuring plan proposed by Hurricane Energy PLC, which sought to cram down the dissenting class of shareholders and hand over the control of the company to its bondholders with a debt-for-equity swap diluting the shareholders down to 5% of their existing shareholding. This is the first time that the English court has declined to sanction a restructuring plan (since their introduction almost a year ago in June 2020), and only the fourth time that the cross-class cram down mechanism has been used.

The application of sovereign immunity principles in bankruptcy cases has vexed the courts for decades. The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions on the matter have not helped much. Although they have addressed the issue in specific contexts, they have not established clear guidelines that the lower courts may apply more generally. The Third Circuit took a crack at clarifying this muddy but important area of the law in the case of Venoco LLC (with its affiliated debtors, the “Debtors”).

Background

2022. július 1. napján lép hatályba az új szerkezetátalakítási törvény, amely megoldást nyújthat a fizetésképtelenség határára sodródott vállalkozások pénzügyi nehézségeinek korai kezelésére, talpra állításuk ösztönzésére, valamint fizetőképességük helyreállítására. Az új, fizetésképtelenséget megelőző szerkezetátalakítási eljárás leginkább a csődeljárás alternatívája lehet; ebben az esetben azonban az adós alapvetően maga döntheti el, hogy mely hitelezőivel tárgyal és kiket von be a folyamatba.

The Government’s roadmap out of lockdown signals a return to trading for a number of businesses hard-hit by the COVID-19 pandemic. There is however potential for heightened financial distress in the coming period as existing support measures are withdrawn and currently deferred liabilities become payable, bringing the challenges faced by this sector into sharp focus.

As already announced in the article of Marc Molhuysen and Olmo Weeshoff of 20 December 2021, the new Dutch pre-insolvency tool, ‘The Act regarding the binding approval of debt restructuring agreements’, widely referred to as the WHOA (Wet homologatie onderhands akkoord) or the “Dutch Scheme” entered into force on 1 January 2021.

The COVID-19 pandemic created unprecedented disruptions across the global economy, perhaps most severely in the retail sector. Shelter-in-place orders, government-mandated closures and other restrictions drastically reduced or entirely wiped out revenue streams, resulting in an increased number of bankruptcy filings by retail debtors.

A week is often described as a long time in politics, and so also (it seems) with the restructuring market.

Last week, we saw significant strides forward with: