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The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas recently clarified the administrative expense standard applicable to indenture trustees by holding that they can recover fees and expenses as administrative expenses only when they make a “substantial contribution.” This standard requires a greater showing than “benefit to the estate,” which is the general administrative expense standard. In re Sanchez Energy Corp., No. 19-34508 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 3, 2021).

Background

Turns out, it depends on who you ask. Judge Bernstein said no. Recently, Judge Glenn said yes, but only for causes of action that resemble actual fraudulent transfers. It is unusual for the bankruptcy judges in Manhattan to disagree with each other, so let’s take a look at the issue.

Background

In a first, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in the Arcapita Bank case had to decide whether Shari’a compliant investment agreements, providing for Murabaha and Wakala transactions, qualify for the safe harbor protections provided in the bankruptcy code for securities contracts, forwards and swaps. The court held that they do not. Since the opinion runs about 100 pages long, we attempt to distill some very basic facts concerning Shari’a compliant transactions and point to important holdings made by the court.

Shari’a Compliant Transactions

Earlier in the pandemic, our team identified the economic crisis caused by COVID-19 as a growth opportunity for businesses with the vision and the resources to take advantage. One such opportunity is the chance to diversify or grow by acquiring distressed competitors, suppliers, or customers.

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held that a purported debt held by an entity with a near-majority membership interest in the Debtor was actually equity disguised as a loan.

Background

In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit closed the door on triangular setoffs, ruling that the mutuality requirement under Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code must be strictly construed and requires that the debt and claim sought to be setoff must be between the same two parties. In re: Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., No. 20-1136 (3d. Cir. 2021).

Background

On January 14, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court decided City of Chicago, Illinois v. Fulton (Case No. 19-357, Jan. 14, 2021), a case which examined whether merely retaining estate property after a bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay provided for by §362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court overruled the bankruptcy court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in deciding that mere retention of property does not violate the automatic stay.

Case Background

In a recent decision, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the election of a tenant, under Section 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, to remain in possession of real property governed by a rejected lease causes a third-party guaranty on another rejected agreement to remain in effect, to the extent such agreement and the lease are part of an integrated transaction.