On September 29, 2020, the United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary advanced a Democrat-backed bill to the full chamber that seeks to address perceived shortcomings in the Bankruptcy Code’s protections for employee and retiree benefits and to curtail the use of bonuses and special compensation arrangements for executives in bankruptcy cases.
The UK Government has long been considering significant reforms of the UK’s insolvency framework, even before the advent of COVID-19. The pandemic resulted in the acceleration of those reforms and the passing of the new Corporate Insolvency and Governance Act 2020 (the “Act”), which came into force in June.
On July 27, 2020, the Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court (the “Court”) released its decision in Great North Data Ltd., (Re),[1] where Justice Handrigan outlined principles for courts to consider when exercising their power under section 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
Recently, in In re Tribune Company, the Third Circuit affirmed that the Bankruptcy Code means exactly what it says and that the enforcement of subordination agreements can be abridged when cramming down confirmation of a chapter 11 plan over a rejecting class entitled to the benefit of the subordination agreement, so long as doing so does not “unfairly discriminate” against the rejecting class (and the other requirements for a cramdown are satisfied).
A recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (the “Court”) in the receivership proceedings of The Clover on Yonge Inc.[1] (the “Clover Project”) has addressed the question of whether a debtor in receivership can avoid a sales process by redeeming its outstanding debt.
A recent decision in the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”) proceedings of Bellatrix Exploration Ltd.[1] (“Bellatrix”) serves as a useful reminder to professionals that a
Everyone, including the least empathic in our society (aka, lawyers), knows that we should seek to uphold the golden rule and “do unto others…” with respect to family, friends, and acquaintances, but does this also apply in the corporate world? Apparently so, as a Delaware bankruptcy court just ruled that preferred shareholders with a bankruptcy-filing blocking right (also known as a “Golden Share”) must consider the effects on other shareholders and all other creditors when exercising such right.
Analyzing the inner workings of the elements required for the securities contract “safe harbor” protection under Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Bankruptcy Court for the SDNY dismissed a complaint seeking to recover approximately US$1 billion in allegedly fraudulent transfers brought against various transferees as part of the Boston Generating Chapter 11 case.
As Canadian businesses continue to grapple with decreased cash flow as a result of COVID-19, many are looking for ways to generate cash and remain viable. One such way is to sell non-core assets or divisions through a pre-packaged sale transaction.
Pre-Packaged Sale Overview
No, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Maxus Energy Corp. In Maxus, the defendant, Vista Analytical Laboratory, Inc. (“Vista” or the “Defendant”), a designated critical vendor, sought summary judgement dismissing the preference complaint. The Court denied summary judgement finding that the critical vendor status did not per se insulate Vista from preference actions.
Background