Background
Following various disputes as to the scope of the collateral given to secured creditors, the debtors and certain of their noteholders jointly proposed a chapter 11. The plan included a rights offering that the consenting noteholders agreed to backstop. These consenting noteholders were granted the right to purchase significant equity of the reorganized debtors at a discount and receive significant premiums for their agreement to backstop the rights offering and support the plan.
Seafood Shack Ltd v Alan Darlow [2019] EWHC 1567 (Ch)
A lease of restaurant premises was granted to a company that did not exist; there was no legal basis for correcting the lease, and the similarly-named company claiming rights was held to have none.
An IRA owner could not rely on a Florida exemption to shield his IRA account from creditors after engaging in prohibited acts of self-dealing with his IRA funds, the Eleventh Circuit held in Yerian v. Webber, 2019 WL 2610751 (11th Cir. June 26, 2019). The IRA owner, Keith Yerian, opened a self-directed IRA. The IRA was governed by two contracts.
On May 20, 2019, the US Supreme Court clarified that when a trademark licensor rejects a trademark license agreement in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding, the rejection does not rescind the use rights of the licensee under the license agreement. The decision resolved a circuit split on this issue between the First and Seventh Circuits. The Court held that the licensor’s rejection of the license agreement in bankruptcy has the same effect on the licensee’s rights as a licensor’s breach of the license agreement outside of bankruptcy.
A recent decision out of the District Court for the Southern District of New York may bring greater certainty to the interpretation of what constitutes a “financial institution” in connection with the safe harbor in section 546(e) of the bankruptcy code. The decision, In re Tribune Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 69081 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
Merit Management
Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky et al., is a New York case which gets to the heart of the enforceability of classic single-purpose entity restrictions in commercial real estate lending. At issue is how far a third-party may go to cause a violation of a borrower’s SPE covenants, and whether those covenants are enforceable at all.
A Defaulted Construction Loan and Frustrated Attempts to Foreclose:
In Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a question that vexed the lower courts and resulted in a circuit split: does the rejection by a debtor-licensor of a trademark license agreement terminate the licensee’s rights under the rejected license?
It is a well-established principle of bankruptcy law that claims generally crystallize as of the bankruptcy petition date. Of course, section 506(b) of the bankruptcy code allows over-secured, secured creditors to recover post-petition interest and costs, including reasonable legal fees, if their documentation provides them with the right to recover these costs. But what about unsecured creditors – are post-petition legal fees incurred by an unsecured creditor whose contract with the debtor provides for reimbursement of legal fees allowed or not?
Last year, a California Bankruptcy Court wiped out $10.2 million in default interest (“DRI”) when it ruled that a 5% DRI was an unenforceable penalty in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case where the construction lender fully recovered principal, interest, and other costs of collection.