Should a claim for appraisal rights brought by a former shareholder of a Chapter 11 debtor be subordinated under Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code? According to the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the answer is yes. See In re: RTI Holding Co., LLC, No. 20-12456, 2021 WL 3409802 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 4, 2021).

Background

Trillions of dollars of securities are issued on the strength of bankruptcy remoteness and special purpose entities (“SPVs”) intended to be bankruptcy remote. These transactions generally involve hundreds of millions of dollars and investors’ expectations that the SPVs will not be dragged into a potential bankruptcy filing of their non-SPV affiliates.

In a recent opinion, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland dealt with a conflict between the strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements and the Bankruptcy Code’s emphasis on centralization of claims. Based on an analysis of the two statutory schemes and their underlying policies and concerns, the Court decided to lift the automatic stay to allow the prepetition arbitration proceeding to go forward with respect to non-core claims.

Background

On 28 June 2021, the English High Court handed down a judgment declining to sanction a restructuring plan proposed by Hurricane Energy PLC, which sought to cram down the dissenting class of shareholders and hand over the control of the company to its bondholders with a debt-for-equity swap diluting the shareholders down to 5% of their existing shareholding. This is the first time that the English court has declined to sanction a restructuring plan (since their introduction almost a year ago in June 2020), and only the fourth time that the cross-class cram down mechanism has been used.

The application of sovereign immunity principles in bankruptcy cases has vexed the courts for decades. The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions on the matter have not helped much. Although they have addressed the issue in specific contexts, they have not established clear guidelines that the lower courts may apply more generally. The Third Circuit took a crack at clarifying this muddy but important area of the law in the case of Venoco LLC (with its affiliated debtors, the “Debtors”).

Background

"`Staggering' legal fees in Boy Scouts Bankruptcy Case." So read the title of an article in The New York Times on May 11, 2021. According to the reporter, a "lawyer negotiating a resolution to the multi-billion dollar bankruptcy filed by the Boy Scouts of America billed $267,435 in a single month. Another charged $1,725 for each hour of work. New lawyers fresh out of law school have been billing at an hourly rate of more than $600." The bankruptcy judge presiding over the case has called the fee totals "staggering," said the reporter.

The Third Circuit recently held, in a case from the Energy Future Holdings bankruptcy, that a losing stalking horse bidder can provide sufficient value to the debtor’s estate to receive an administrative claim for a break-up fee and expenses. In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 990 F.3d 728, 748 (3rd Cir. 2021). This represents an expansive view of potential administrative claims related to those costs, providing bidders significant potential protections for their bids.

“[B]ankruptcy inevitably creates harsh results for some players,” explained the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on May 21, 2021, when it denied a film producer’s claim for contractual cure payments. In re Weinstein Company Holdings, LLC, 2021 WL 2023058, *9 (3d Cir. May 21, 2021).

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas recently clarified the administrative expense standard applicable to indenture trustees by holding that they can recover fees and expenses as administrative expenses only when they make a “substantial contribution.” This standard requires a greater showing than “benefit to the estate,” which is the general administrative expense standard. In re Sanchez Energy Corp., No. 19-34508 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 3, 2021).

Background

Turns out, it depends on who you ask. Judge Bernstein said no. Recently, Judge Glenn said yes, but only for causes of action that resemble actual fraudulent transfers. It is unusual for the bankruptcy judges in Manhattan to disagree with each other, so let’s take a look at the issue.

Background