In our Intellectual Property Law Update of December 2016 we advised you of the recent decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit Court of Appeals (the “BAP”) in Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology (In re Tempnology, LLC) upholding the rights of a licensee of trademarks to continue use of trademarks after the debtor’s rejection of the trademark license. As set forth below, the First Circuit recently reversed that decision.  

On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper application of the safe harbor set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a provision that prohibits the avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was made in connection with a securities contract and made by or to (or for the benefit of) certain qualified entities, including a financial institution.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.

Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

In In re Hungry Horse, LLC, Adversary Proceeding No. 16-11222 (Bankr. D. N.M. September 20, 2017) (“Hungry Horse”), the New Mexico Bankruptcy Court reminded us that many U.S. Supreme Court opinions can be limited in scope and do not necessarily dispose of all potential remedies to an issue.

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

In In re NewPage Corporation, et al., Adversary Proceeding No. 13-52429 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 13, 2017), a Delaware Bankruptcy Court applied a unique defense to certain preferential transfers targeted by a liquidating trustee. The defense focuses on a commonly overlooked element of a preferential transfer, section 547(b)(5).

Preference 101

State and federal laws provide numerous protections to secured parties to preserve their interests in collateral. As secured parties well know, however, these protections become more and more limited when the collateral is pledged to multiple secured parties. Issues, like priority of interests and liens, become more prevalent when the collateral at issue falls in value and multiple secured parties are fighting to enforce their interests in order to satisfy their debts.

State and federal laws provide numerous protections to secured parties to preserve their interests in collateral.  As secured parties well know, however, these protections become more and more limited when the collateral is pledged to multiple secured parties.  Issues, like priority of interests and liens, become more prevalent when the collateral at issue falls in value and multiple secured parties are fighting to enforce their interests in order to satisfy their debts.

On January 17, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., 1 ruling that Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (the “Act”), prohibits only non-consensual amendments to core payment terms of bond indentures.