On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.
The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. [1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.
Background
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a 2-1 opinion, recognized a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case could be dismissed through a “structured dismissal” that deviates from the priority scheme set forth in Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code.1 With its decision, the Third Circuit joined the Second Circuit in rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s per se exclusion on “structured dismissals” that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s prio
As the market for so-called “unitranche” credit facilities continues to increase, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court had an opportunity recently to answer positively the question of whether bankruptcy courts will enforce the Agreement Among Lenders (“AAL”) (a form of intercreditor agreement) used in such structures.
Background: Grupo OAS, a Brazilian construction conglomerate linked to a massive corruption scandal (“OAS”), filed for Chapter 15 creditor protection in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on April 15, 2015, two weeks after entering bankruptcy in Brazil. If “recognized” by Bankruptcy Judge Stuart Bernstein, the Chapter 15 petition would, among other things, essentially bind OAS creditors in the United States to the restructuring terms approved by the Brazilian court overseeing OAS’s reorganization.
On March 12, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the authority of a bankruptcy court to issue non-consensual, non-debtor releases in connection with the confirmation of a plan of reorganization.1 With this decision, the Eleventh Circuit joined the majority view that such releases are permissible under certain circumstances.
Background
On January 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit entered an opinion holding that an authorized UCC-3 termination statement is effective, for purposes of Delaware’s Uniform Commercial Code (the “UCC”), to terminate the perfection of the underlying security interest even though the secured lender never intended to extinguish the security interest and mistakenly authorized the filing.1
Background
Aereo, Inc. will be permitted to auction off its live television streaming technology to the highest bidder in accordance with a December 24 order, signed by a New York bankruptcy court judge, approving a deal between Aereo and the broadcast television networks on the sale process.
On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).