The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. ^[1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.

Background

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.

On May 4, 2015, Vice Chancellor Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery issued a decision in Quadrant Structured Products Co., Ltd. v. Vertin,¹ analyzing creditors’ standing to bring derivative claims against directors and officers of Delaware corporations. Building on the Delaware Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding fiduciary duties owed to creditors,²Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion has two primary holdings.

Aereo, Inc. will be permitted to auction off its live television streaming technology to the highest bidder in accordance with a December 24 order, signed by a New York bankruptcy court judge, approving a deal between Aereo and the broadcast television networks on the sale process.  

This article was originally published by LatinFinance on November 25, 2014.

A rise of cross-border insolvencies in recent years has generated substantial litigation. In some cases, US bondholders, perceiving their treatment under a foreign reorganization plan to be inequitable, have sought a second chance by opposing the plan in the US on the grounds that its enforcement would be contrary to domestic public policy.

On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark  licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a  debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of  intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et  al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).

This article first appeared in the American Bankruptcy Institute, November, 2014.

In a decision released on June 25, 2014, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that ASARCO LLC could not maintain CERCLA cost recovery actions against the trustees of residuary trusts created by the will of John D. Rockefeller, Sr. ASARCO, as part of its emergence from Chapter 11 bankruptcy, paid the US, the State of Washington, and the Port of Everett, Washington $50.2 million to settle pending CERCLA claims at two Superfund sites in Washington State.

A unanimous Supreme Court, in Executive Benefits Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Arkinson (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 573 U.S. ___ (2014), confirmed a bankruptcy court’s power to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the district court’s de novo review, even though such court is constitutionally barred from entering a final judgment on a bankruptcy-related claim under Stern v. Marshall.

A recent decision by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington found that certain distressed debt funds were not “financial institutions” under the definition of “Eligible Assignee” in the applicable loan agreement and thus were not entitled to vote on the debtor’s chapter 11 plan of reorganization. The District Court decision affirmed a bankruptcy court decision enjoining loan assignments to the funds and recently denied the funds’ motion to vacate the decision.”¹