The Great Recession of 2008 may seem a distant memory. September 15, 2018 is the 10th anniversary of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, and often seen as the point at which a garden-variety recession turned into the Great Recession, with catastrophic results severely impacting the livelihood of millions.

On June 20, 2018, Judge Kevin J. Carey of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware sustained an objection to a proof of claim filed by a postpetition debt purchaser premised on anti-assignment clauses contained in transferred promissory notes. In re Woodbridge Group of Companies, LLC, et al., No. 17-12560, at *14 (jointly administered) (Bankr. D. Del. Jun. 20, 2018).

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The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut recently examined a question at the heart of an existing circuit split regarding the consequences of trademark license rejection in bankruptcy: can a trademark licensee retain the use of a licensed trademark post-rejection? In re SIMA International, Inc., 2018 WL 2293705 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 17, 2018).

After a January 2018 decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, trademark licensees are faced with uncertainty again. (In re Tempnology, LLC, 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018)). In our previous update, we discussed a 7th Circuit case dealing with the same issue. At the time we predicted that the holding in the case may have resolved the issue. (Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012)). But that was wrong.

On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper application of the safe harbor set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a provision that prohibits the avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was made in connection with a securities contract and made by or to (or for the benefit of) certain qualified entities, including a financial institution.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.

Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

In a May 2, 2017 decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided the fate of a stream of rental payments from the bankrupt owner of a residential complex. (In re: Town Center Flats, LLC, No. 16-1812, May 2, 2017, Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals) The case resembled a similar one, far more controversial and with a different result, from 1993. (Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2nd 948, 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, 1993) The Octagon Gas case roiled the factoring and receivables purchasing industry.

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).