On April 15, 2016, the IRS released a generic legal advice memorandum (GLAM 2016-001) (the “April GLAM”) addressing the impact of so-called “bad boy” guarantees (also known as nonrecourse carve-out guarantees) on the characterization of underlying partnership debt as recourse vs. nonrecourse under Section 752 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Section 133 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 places a general moratorium on legal proceedings, while the company is under business rescue. This provides a company with time and resources to be rehabilitated through the implementation of a business rescue plan. As a result, there is some debate as to whether creditors are precluded from perfecting their security, such as a notarial bond, under business rescue.

There has always been a degree of uncertainty when it comes to a business rescue practitioner’s costs and expenses incurred in the business rescue proceedings of an entity when the business recue proceedings are, for whatever reason, converted to liquidation proceedings.

Shareholders who received nearly $8 billion from the Tribune Company leveraged buyout (LBO) do not have to give back that money as a constructive fraudulent transfer. Although the possibility remains that the creditors can recover this money through the pending intentional fraudulent transfer claims, which are much more difficult to prove, the Second Circuit recently held that the Bankruptcy Code preempts creditors from recovering under state constructive fraud theories when shareholders receive distributions under securities contracts effectuated through financial institutions.

A recent bankruptcy court decision from the influential Southern District of New York permitted a debtor to reject executory contracts with midstream gathers as an exercise of sound business judgment. In In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation, the court issued an advisory ruling in which it determined that certain provisions of the rejected contracts were not covenants that ran with the land, and thus could be rejected thereby relieving the debtor of a financial hardship.

The ‘dual jurisdiction’ regime has long been entrenched in South Africa’s corporate insolvency law. This principal arises from the provisions of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973 (Old Act), which provides that jurisdiction over a company is determined by the location of both its registered address and its principal place of business with the creditor having the choice of jurisdiction.

With the enactment of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (New Act), the question that then follows is: Does this principle of jurisdiction continue to apply under the New Act?

A few thoughts on Tuesday’s oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in the litigation over whether Puerto Rico’s Public Corporations Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, an insolvency statute for certain of its government instrumentalities, is void, as the lower federal courts held, under Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code:

While secured creditors are entitled to special rights in bankruptcy, those rights may differ depending on whether creditors have a statutory or consensual lien on their collateral. This is primarily because section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part, that “property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement . . .

In order for an application for business rescue to successfully suspend commenced liquidation proceedings, it must be served on the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), together with all affected persons in terms of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act). This position was confirmed in the Gauteng Local Division’s decision handed down on 10 March 2016.

In the Ultimate Escapes bankruptcy case, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware recently held that the “business judgment rule” may protect fiduciaries who negotiate and enter into unconventional financing agreements in an attempt to save the company. In short, a failed business strategy by itself does not lead to liability for breach of fiduciary duty.