The Delaware bankruptcy court recently decided that a debtor could not assign a trademark license absent the consent of the licensor. The court concluded that federal trademark law and the terms of the license precluded assignment without consent. Because the debtor could not assign the license under any circumstances (consent was not forthcoming), the court held that cause existed to annul the automatic stay to permit the licensor to “move on with its trademark and its business.”
Exculpation provisions in operating agreements must be carefully crafted in order to protect members, managers, directors and officers for breaches of fiduciary duties. In In re Simplexity, LLC, the Chapter 7 trustee sued the former officers and directors (who were also members and/or managers) for failing to act to preserve going concern value and exposing the debtors to WARN Act claims. The defendants argued the exculpation language in the operating agreements shielded against breach of fiduciary duty liability.
The High Court has refused a challenge by a liquidator to an invoice discounting agreement entered into by the Company prior to liquidation.
The liquidator argued that the invoice discounting agreement was in fact a loan agreement under which the Bank took a charge over the Company’s book debts. If that was the case, then those funds would be funds in the liquidation and the Bank an unsecured creditor, because the loan agreement was not registered and therefore void as against the liquidator.
The High Court recently rejected an appeal by KBC Bank Ireland (“KBC”) to write down a portion of a debtor couple’s mortgage due to the uncertainty in the ability of the debtors to repay the warehousing portion of the loan. The Personal Insolvency Arrangement (“PIA”) which had been approved by the Circuit Court was upheld.
It is very common for bankruptcy court orders to provide that the court retains jurisdiction to enforce such orders. Similarly, chapter 11 confirmation orders routinely provide that the bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction over all orders previously entered in the case. The enforceability of these “retention of jurisdiction” provisions, however, will not rest on the plain language in the order but on the bankruptcy court’s statutory jurisdiction.
Earlier this month, the Supreme Court announced that it will review the scope of Bankruptcy Code section 546(e)’s safe harbor provision. Section 546(e) protects from avoidance those transfers that are made “by or to (or for the benefit of)” a financial institution, except where there is actual fraud. The safe harbor is intended to ensure the stability of the securities market in the event of corporate restructurings.
As noted in a recent Distressing Matters post, the United States Supreme Court in In re Jevic Holding Corp. held that debtors cannot use structured dismissals to make payments to creditors in violation of ordinary bankruptcy distribution priority rules.
A recent High Court case has brought about a change in the status quo involving personal insolvency arrangements and separated spouses. Banks were previously unable to complete deals with one spouse without the mutual cooperation of both parties. However the decision of JD & Personal Insolvency Acts1 has altered this position.
In 2015, Distressing Matters reported on the Third Circuit’s decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp., wherein that panel ruled that, in rare circumstances, bankruptcy courts may approve the distribution of settlement proceeds in a manner that violates the Bankruptcy Code’s statutory priority scheme.
The filing of a bankruptcy case puts in place an automatic injunction, or stay, that halts most actions by creditors against a debtor. But can a creditor violate the automatic stay by not acting? The Tenth Circuit recently addressed the issue in WD Equipment, LLC v. Cowen (In re Cowen), adding to the split of authority on the issue.