Since it was issued three years ago by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the Clear Channel decision (Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2008)) has been widely criticized as “an aberration in well-settled bankruptcy jurisprudence.” Before Clear Channel, conventional wisdom (and what most people perceived to be the law) supported the notion that a bankruptcy sale order that contained a good faith finding under Section 363(m) could not be disturbed on appeal.
In a decision that may have significant practical implications to the practice of bankruptcy law, the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, on constitutional grounds, that a bankruptcy court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a debtor’s state law counterclaims, thus considerably limiting the ability of the bankruptcy court to fully and finally adjudicate claims in a bankruptcy case. Stern v. Marshall, No. 10-179 (June 23, 2011).
In an apparent case of first impression in Massachusetts, the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts recently held that an allonge must be physically affixed to the original promissory note to be effective.
Generally speaking, Massachusetts is a non-judicial foreclosure state – meaning that lenders can foreclose on mortgages of Massachusetts property without seeking judicial approval beforehand. In certain circumstances, however, a pre-foreclosure judicial proceeding is required solely to determine whether the borrower is in the active military service and entitled to the protections of the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §532.
A Massachusetts trial court has denied a borrower’s request to stop a foreclosure proceeding despite the borrower’s claim that the loan was “unfair” under the Massachusetts consumer protection law, Chapter 93A of the General Laws. In its May 13 decision denying the borrower’s request for an injunction, the court examined a stated income (no documentation) loan and determined that the borrower was not likely to prevail on a claim that the loan featured a combination of four characteristics that qualify as “unfair” under Chapter 93A.