A Melomed Finance (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Harris Jeffrey (SGHC Case no: 2016/A5028) (Judgment handed down 23 June 2017)

The South Gauteng High Court, sitting as a court of appeal, recently handed down a judgment to the effect that a verbal acknowledgement of debt when made at an enquiry held into the affairs of a company, in terms of s417 and s418 of the Companies Act, No 61 of 1973 (s417 enquiry), can be used as evidence in subsequent civil litigation to recover the amount so acknowledged.

Since 1956, legislation has required suretyship agreements to be embodied in a written document. A suretyship agreement involves three parties; simplistically if A does not pay B, then C will. C will step into the shoes of A and perform A’s obligations for them.

The introduction of business rescue proceedings by Chapter 6 of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act) created uncertainty on various levels, in particular the extent and nature of certain rights previously enjoyed by creditors.

Our courts are making progress in finding a path through the muddy waters in this regard and every day a judgment is delivered that sheds some light on previous uncertain propositions.

In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. 855 F.3d 459 (2d Cir. 2017), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court order subordinating the claims of former Lehman Bros.

Asarco LLC v. Noranda Mining, Inc., 844 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2017). In a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) contribution action, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a mining company, whose liability for a contaminated site had been resolved in a settlement agreement approved by the bankruptcy court, could still seek contribution against other potentially responsible parties (PRPs), claiming that it overpaid its fair share of cleanup costs for the site. Id. at 1208.

In the case of First Rand Bank Limited v KJ Foods CC (in business rescue) (734/2015) [2015] ZA SCA 50 (26 April 2017), the main issue that the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) had to determine was whether the High Court of Pretoria (Court a quo) was correct in setting aside a vote by the appellant, FirstRand Bank Limited (FNB), against the adoption of a business rescue plan (plan) on the basis that it was reasonable and just to do so in terms of s153(7) of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008 (Act).

BUSINESS RESCUE, RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY: THE COURT’S POWER TO SET ASIDE THE DISSENTING VOTE OF A CREDITOR IN BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS If satisfied that it is reasonable and just to do so, a court may set aside a dissenting vote on a business rescue plan. In Collard v Jatara Connect (Pty) Ltd & Others [2017] ZAWCHC 45, the court did exactly that. Explaining his decision, Judge Dlodlo stated that there should be no reason to prefer a winding up application over a business rescue plan that will pay the employees of the company in full and result in a better return for creditors.

On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. __ (2017) held that a bankruptcy court does not have the power to approve a structured dismissal of a bankruptcy case that violates the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme unless the affected parties consent.

“Whenever any person (hereinafter called the insurer) is obliged to indemnify another person (hereinafter called the insured) in respect of any liability incurred by the insured towards a third party, the latter shall, on the sequestration of the estate of the insured, be entitled to recover from the insurer the amount of the insured’s liability towards the third party but not exceeding the maximum amount for which the insurer has bound himself to indemnify the insured” – s156 of the Insolvency Act, No 24 of 1936 as amended (Act).

In the case of BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Intertrans Earl SA (Pty) Ltd & Others (34716/2016) [2016] ZAGPJHC 310 (25 November 2016), the court had to consider two important issues: firstly, whether suspension of a contract by the business rescue practitioner in terms of s136(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Companies Act, No 1971 of 2008 (Act) suspends not only the obligations of the business rescue practitioner to perform in terms of the contract entered into between the parties, but whether it also suspends the obligations of the other contracting parties.