The Russian government has introduced a bankruptcy moratorium with effect from 1 April to 1 October 2022 in respect of all Russian legal entities and individuals (“Persons“) except for certain residential real estate developers.

The moratorium is intended to protect Russian debtors against creditors’ claims and provide support for players on the Russian market given the challenging environment they operate in.

The key consequences of the introduction of the moratorium regime are as follows:

Introduction

From a civil litigation and insolvency perspective, we look at the key impacts of the Hong Kong Courts’ recent General Adjournment of Proceedings (GAP) from 7 March 2022 to 11 April 2022 and related governmental closures.

Key Takeaways

1. The recent implementation of GAP has resulted in a de facto stay of new actions and proceedings, and adjournment of existing actions, including bankruptcy and winding-up petitions.

In brief

The courts were busy in the second half of 2021 with developments in the space where insolvency law and environmental law overlap.

In Victoria, the Court of Appeal has affirmed the potential for a liquidator to be personally liable, and for there to be a prospective ground to block the disclaimer of contaminated land, where the liquidator has the benefit of a third-party indemnity for environmental exposures.¹

In brief

The Rating (Coronavirus) and Directors Disqualification (Dissolved Companies) Act ("Act") received royal assent on 15 December 2021.

The Act extends the scope of powers available to the Insolvency Service to address the issue of directors dissolving companies to avoid paying their liabilities.

In brief

The Rating (Coronavirus) and Directors Disqualification (Dissolved Companies) Act ("Act") received royal assent on 15 December 2021.

The Act extends the scope of powers available to the Insolvency Service to address the issue of directors dissolving companies to avoid paying their liabilities.

As of November 1, 2021, dealers in security-based swaps (“SBS”) whose dealing activity exceeds certain de minimis thresholds (e.g., gross notional amount of $3 billion for credit default SBS, $150 million for other SBS, and $25 million for SBS where the counterparty is a special entity) are required to register with the SEC as a security-based swap dealer (“SBSD”) and to comply with the SEC’s regulations applicable to SBS.

The High Court, in its recent judgment In the matter of ipagoo LLP (in administration) [2021] EWHC 2163 (Ch) (Ipagoo), has determined that no statutory trust exists over safeguarded funds held under the Electronic Money Regulations 2011 (EMRs). This can be contrasted with the decision In Re Supercapital [2020] EWHC 1685 (Ch) (Supercapital) which found that the Payment Services Regulations 2017 (PSRs) create a statutory trust over safeguarded funds.

Most restructuring professionals will tell you that there is no “typical” restructuring. That is absolutely true. Every financially distressed business is different and the character and direction of its restructuring will be highly dependent upon, among others, its capital structure, its liquidity profile, and the level of support it can build for its reorganization among key stakeholder bodies. Nevertheless, there are some important similarities in the way that any company should initially address a distressed situation.

In brief

"All happy families are alike, each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. With apologies to Tolstoy, the Akhmedov family is one of the unhappiest ever to have appeared in my courtroom." – Mrs. Justice Knowles