In Topfer v. Topfer (In re Topfer), Case No. 5-18-ap-00066 RNO (M.D. Pa. July 25, 2018), the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania remanded a three-and half year old divorce proceeding that had been removed to bankruptcy court. But, the remand became more complicated than it needed to be.

The chapter 7 debtor had removed the divorce action immediately after filing for chapter 7 bankruptcy. Shortly after removal, the non-debtor spouse moved to remand the case on mandatory abstention and permissive abstention grounds.

Banks regularly enter into commercial relationships with their customers such as opening new depository accounts.  These relationships are often contractual in nature and seem relatively straightforward until an unexpected incident occurs that causes the relationship to unravel. What then are the duties owed by each party to each another?  The default rule seems to be that the terms and conditions that the parties agreed to at first govern the parties’ actions throughout their banking relationship.

The term “golden shares” is often referred to equity interests held by a specific party—commonly a lender or investor—that authorize such party to block or prevent a corporate entity from filing bankruptcy. Such shares are often negotiated by a party that wants to ensure that its consent is obtained before any bankruptcy is commenced. Without such consent, the party holding the golden shares can seek to dismiss to a corporate bankruptcy filing by based on a lack of corporate authority.

The Bankruptcy Code often instructs a trustee or debtor to perform an act or make an election within a certain time. Sometimes the relevant provisions are intended to benefit a party in interest who is affected by a debtor’s or trustee’s action or election. Unfortunately, some of the provisions that prescribe a trustee or debtor to act fail to provide a remedy to the affected party in interest in the event the trustee or debtor does not act in compliance with the Code.

Certified to the Privacy Shield? Great! So you’re done in terms of GDPR compliance, right? Think again.

As we have discussed in previous newsletters, no matter where you are in the world, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies to you if you are collecting or processing personal data of any EU individual. The law goes into effect in May.

In our Intellectual Property Law Update of December 2016 we advised you of the recent decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit Court of Appeals (the “BAP”) in Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology (In re Tempnology, LLC) upholding the rights of a licensee of trademarks to continue use of trademarks after the debtor’s rejection of the trademark license. As set forth below, the First Circuit recently reversed that decision.  

In In re Spanish Peaks Holdings II, LLC, Case No. 15-35572 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 2017), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a bankruptcy trustee may use Section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code to sell real property free and clear of unexpired leases without affording the non-debtor lessees the right to retain possession of the property.

In In re Hungry Horse, LLC, Adversary Proceeding No. 16-11222 (Bankr. D. N.M. September 20, 2017) (“Hungry Horse”), the New Mexico Bankruptcy Court reminded us that many U.S. Supreme Court opinions can be limited in scope and do not necessarily dispose of all potential remedies to an issue.

In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc. 855 F.3d 459 (2d Cir. 2017), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a district court order subordinating the claims of former Lehman Bros.

Asarco LLC v. Noranda Mining, Inc., 844 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2017). In a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) contribution action, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a mining company, whose liability for a contaminated site had been resolved in a settlement agreement approved by the bankruptcy court, could still seek contribution against other potentially responsible parties (PRPs), claiming that it overpaid its fair share of cleanup costs for the site. Id. at 1208.