From the consumer plaintiffs’ perspective, a recent appellate decision in Rundgren v. Washington Mutual Bank, FA, is far from Utopia.

A bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania recently held that trade creditors who supplied goods to a debtor prior to its bankruptcy filing were not entitled to administrative priority status under Bankruptcy Code section 503(b)(9) because the goods were “received by the debtor” at the time they were placed on the vessel at the port overseas more than 20 days before the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, although the debtor took possession of the goods within the 20 day period.  In re World Imports, Ltd. — B.R. —-, 2014 WL 2750258 (Bankr. E.D. Pa., June 18, 2014).

On April 29, 2014, power giant Energy Future Holding Corp. (“Energy Future”), along with 70 subsidiaries, filed for chapter 11 protection in the District of Delaware as part of a deal it has reached through lengthy negotiations with some of its largest senior creditors to restructure roughly $50 billion in debt.

Successor liability is often a concern for the acquirer when purchasing substantially all of a seller’s assets.  While this risk is well known, the circumstances under which an acquirer will be found liable under the theory of successor liability are less clear.  The recent decision in Call Center Techs., Inc. v Grand Adventures Tour & Travel Pub. Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29057, 2014 WL 85934 (D. Conn. 2014), sheds helpful light on this issue by defining the continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability.

After filing for US bankruptcy protection in Texas based on aJapanese bankruptcy, the Judge ordered that Mt.

Law360, New York (March 25, 2014, 1:21 PM ET) -- On Feb. 11, the three private plaintiff-appellants and 11 state plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring et al. v. Jacob J. Lew et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the district court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

On March 19, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided Grede v. FCStone, LLC, Nos. 13-1232, 13-1278 (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 2014), an opinion that reinforces the importance of the portability of investment accounts carrying commodity customer funds. The Seventh Circuit held that commodity futures customer funds must be protected in an insolvency situation, and that the release of customer funds to meet margin obligations should be upheld at all costs.

On Feb. 11, the three private plaintiff- appellants and 11 state plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring et al. v. Jacob J. Lew et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the district court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

On February 11th, the three private plaintiff-appellants and eleven State plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring, et al. v. Jacob J. Lew, et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the District Court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or the “Act”).

The debtor in Law listed his house on his bankruptcy schedules, claiming a homestead exemption in the amount of $75,000 under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 704.730(a)(1). The debtor represented that the house was encumbered by two liens: a note and deed of trust for $147,156.52 in favor of Washington Mutual Bank, and a second note and deed of trust for $156,929.04 in favor of “Lin’s Mortgage & Associates.” Based on these representations, the debtor made it appear as if there was no nonexempt value in the house that the trustee could realize for the benefit of the estate.