On August 16, seven Democrat senators proposed a bill (S.3351, named the “Medical Debt Relief Act of 2018”) to amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to cover certain provisions related to the collection of medical-related debt. The proposed act would institute a 180-day waiting period under the FCRA before medical debt could be reported on a person’s credit report. Further, medical debt that has been settled or paid off would be required to be removed from a person’s credit report within 45 days of payment or settlement.

This brief alert is a follow-up to our previous article published on 1 February 2017, on the SCA judgment and is aimed at reporting on the Constitutional Court judgment.

The Policy

Currently, some courts allow borrowers to bring Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims for non-judicial foreclosures while other courts do not, but that is about to change.

Following on from our previous tax alerts regarding the various proposed amendments pursuant to the draft Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2018 (draft TLAB) published for public comment on 17 July 2018, we discuss in this Tax Alert another significant proposed legislative amendment, specifically related to the allowance for doubtful debts set out in s11(j) of the Income Tax Act, No 58 of 1962 (Act). 

The Southern District of West Virginia recently held that the reporting of an account being paid through a Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan as having an outstanding balance or past due payments does not violate the Fair Credit Reporting Act.

The Gauteng Division of the High Court recently delivered a judgment in the matter of The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and Logikal Consulting (Pty) Ltd and Others, Case No. 96768/2016, in which the court had to interpret, among other things, what comprises a “class” of creditors as contemplated in s155(2) of the Companies Act, No 71 of 2008.

The Supreme Court of Appeal provided clarity in Diener N.O. v Minister of Justice & Others (926/2016) regarding the ranking of the business rescue practitioner’s (BRP) claim for remuneration and expenses. The SCA also clarified whether such claim was conferred a “super preference” over all creditors, secured and unsecured in subsequent liquidation proceedings.

Chapter 13 of the United States Code’s eleventh title (“Bankruptcy Code” or “Code”) “permits any individual with regular income to propose and have approved a reasonable plan for debt repayment based on that individual’s exact circumstances,” explaining why a Chapter 13 plan is commonly known as “a wage earner’s plan.” In general, upon winning approval of such a plan by a bankruptcy court, a debtor is obligated to pay any post-petitio

 A recent development in the ever-evolving jurisprudence associated with business rescue proceedings relates to the remuneration of the business rescue practitioner in the event that a business rescue fails. The Supreme Court of Appeal in Diener N.O. v Minister of Justice (926/2016) [2017] ZASCA 180 has recently confirmed that the practitioner’s fees do not hold a ‘super preference’ in a liquidation scenario and the practitioner is required to prove a claim against the insolvent estate like all other creditors.

A recent development in the ever-evolving jurisprudence associated with business rescue proceedings relates to the remuneration of the business rescue practitioner in the event that a business rescue fails. The Supreme Court of Appeal in Diener N.O. v Minister of Justice (926/2016) [2017] ZASCA 180 has recently confirmed that the practitioner’s fees do not hold a ‘super preference’ in a liquidation scenario and the practitioner is required to prove a claim against the insolvent estate like all other creditors.