Since the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, small business debtors have continued to struggle to reorganize effectively under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. On Friday, August 23, 2019, President Trump signed the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 into law in an effort to address some of these issues.

The United States Senate passed the “Family Farmer Relief Act of 2019” (H.R. 2336), which substantially increases the debt limit for agricultural producers seeking to file for relief under Chapter 12 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. The bipartisan legislation, which passed the U.S.

View original on Law360: https://www.law360.com/articles/1173110/the-upside-of-the-fastest-chapter-11-confirmation-ever

On June 7, 2019, Judge Dennis Montali of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of California San Francisco Division found that FERC’s finding that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the U.S. bankruptcy court over wholesale power agreements was “unenforceable in bankruptcy court and of no force on the parties before it.” Judge Montali further noted that if necessary, the U.S. bankruptcy court will “enjoin FERC from perpetuating its attempt to exercise power it wholly lacks.” At issue, on review by the bankruptcy court, was whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Federal law has long excepted student loans from discharge in bankruptcy in all but the rarest instances, recognizing the problems (and costs) associated with allowing borrowers to wipe out defaulted debts through a bankruptcy filing. However, as the issues of access to college and affordability become frequent topics in political discourse, new ideas for radical changes to the treatment of student loan debt in bankruptcy have been proposed. Lenders and servicers need to be up to speed on those proposals and ready to adjust their operations if any become law.

In Witt v. United Cos. Lending Corp. (“In re Witt”), 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Circuit held that Chapter 13 debtors are not permitted to bifurcate undersecured home mortgage loans into separate secured and unsecured claims. In re Witt, 113 F.3d at 509. Recently, the Court overruled this twenty-two-year-old decision in an en banc opinion, Hurlburt v. Black, No. 17-2449, 2019 WL 2237966 (4th Cir. 2019).

In preparing a merchant cash advance (MCA) agreement on behalf of the provider, there is constant tension between the urge to include every conceivable contractual right for protecting the provider’s economic interests and the need to avoid language that might reorder the parties’ relationship in a way that renders the entire agreement unenforceable. Deciding how to address the possibility that the merchant might pursue bankruptcy poses a particularly challenging dilemma.

It is well settled that the purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition is to “give[] the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, (1934). A debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy, and the corresponding injunction provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, are the two primary elements that effectuate this financial fresh start.Chapman v. Bituminous Ins. Co. (In re Coho Res., Inc.), 345 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2003).

In a unanimous, and perhaps unsurprising, decision, the Supreme Court determined that a creditor may be held in civil contempt for violating the discharge injunction if there is “no fair ground of doubt” as to whether the creditor’s conduct was barred by the order placing that injunction. The Supreme Court declined to adopt the standard of either of the courts below – the bankruptcy court’s strict liability standard or the Ninth Circuit’s good faith belief “even…if unreasonable” standard.

The Supreme Court reminded bankrupt debtors on Monday that mere rejection of a contract does not turn back the clock to avoid contractual obligations. This was the thrust of its holding in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, which held that a rejection of an executory contract—in this case, a trademark license—under Section 365(a) constitutes a breach of the contract, not a rescission.