The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently affirmed in part and reversed in part a trial court’s judgment against a debtor who filed an adversary proceeding alleging that a creditor and its counsel violated the bankruptcy discharge by trying to collect a discharged debt, holding that the attorney could not be held in contempt because he lacked knowledge of the discharge, but the creditor could be held liable for the actions of its counsel under agency law.

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau published its quarterly consumer credit trends report on September 25. In the Report, the CFPB gave an in-depth look at bankruptcy trends and the impact of filing for the period 2001-2018, which includes the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) and the Great Recession.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently reversed a bankruptcy court’s ruling that a lender failed to perfect its security interest because its UCC financing statement failed to provide sufficient indication of the secured collateral under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the bankruptcy court’s denial of a debtor-borrower’s motion for sanctions, which alleged that her mortgage loan servicer violated her bankruptcy discharge by mailing a communication in a purported attempt to collect upon a discharged debt.

In determining the legal standard for holding a creditor in civil contempt for attempting to collect a debt in violation of a bankruptcy discharge order, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted an “objectively reasonable” standard, and held that a court may hold a creditor in civil contempt if there is “no fair ground of doubt” as to whether the order barred the creditor’s conduct.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, which had applied a subjective standard for civil contempt.

View original on Law360: https://www.law360.com/articles/1173110/the-upside-of-the-fastest-chapter-11-confirmation-ever

On June 7, 2019, Judge Dennis Montali of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of the Northern District of California San Francisco Division found that FERC’s finding that it had concurrent jurisdiction with the U.S. bankruptcy court over wholesale power agreements was “unenforceable in bankruptcy court and of no force on the parties before it.” Judge Montali further noted that if necessary, the U.S. bankruptcy court will “enjoin FERC from perpetuating its attempt to exercise power it wholly lacks.” At issue, on review by the bankruptcy court, was whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

In Witt v. United Cos. Lending Corp. (“In re Witt”), 113 F.3d 508 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Circuit held that Chapter 13 debtors are not permitted to bifurcate undersecured home mortgage loans into separate secured and unsecured claims. In re Witt, 113 F.3d at 509. Recently, the Court overruled this twenty-two-year-old decision in an en banc opinion, Hurlburt v. Black, No. 17-2449, 2019 WL 2237966 (4th Cir. 2019).

In preparing a merchant cash advance (MCA) agreement on behalf of the provider, there is constant tension between the urge to include every conceivable contractual right for protecting the provider’s economic interests and the need to avoid language that might reorder the parties’ relationship in a way that renders the entire agreement unenforceable. Deciding how to address the possibility that the merchant might pursue bankruptcy poses a particularly challenging dilemma.

It is well settled that the purpose of filing a bankruptcy petition is to “give[] the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt.” Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, (1934). A debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy, and the corresponding injunction provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, are the two primary elements that effectuate this financial fresh start.Chapman v. Bituminous Ins. Co. (In re Coho Res., Inc.), 345 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2003).