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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) Chair Martin Gruenberg gave remarks to the Cities for Financial Empowerment Fund 2023 Bank On National Conference yesterday in which he said that the FDIC “shares the Bank On movement’s commitment to advancing Americans’ economic inclusion in the banking system.”

In years past defaulting lender mechanics in a subscription credit facility may have been viewed as boiler plate language and, in most cases, the relevant provisions have not received much attention. In light of recent events in the banking industry, defaulting lender provisions have gained some renewed attention. In this article we take a look at the current general state of defaulting lender provisions and the impacts on the lender and borrower.

In a ruling issued just yesterday, MOAC Mall Holdings LLC v. Transform Holdco LLC et al., 598 U.S. ----, 2023 WL 2992693 (2023) (“MOAC”), the United States Supreme Court (the “Supreme Court”) held that Bankruptcy Code section 363(m) is not jurisdictional in terms of appellate review of asset sale orders, but rather, that such section only contains limitations on the relief that may be afforded on appeal. Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code is often relied upon by purchasers of assets in a bankruptcy case as providing finality to any sale order.

Yes, says the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in the case of CII Parent, Inc., cementing the advice routinely given by bankruptcy counsel to borrowers in default. We always counsel borrower clients in default of the risk associated with lenders taking unilateral actions pre-filing, stripping debtors of valuable options and assets. Thus, we normally recommend to always obtain a forbearance and undertake the preparations required to file a bankruptcy petition immediately upon forbearance termination, although whether or not to file depends on variety of factors that should be considered.

The Second Circuit recently held that a non-party to an assumed executory contract is not entitled to a cure payment (although it may be so entitled if is a third-party beneficiary of the contract). The result would have seemed obvious to bankruptcy practitioners. So, what in the world made the party pursuing payment take this to the Second Circuit? Well, surprisingly, as the Second Circuit decision shows, the answer is not found in the plain text of the Bankruptcy Code. And while it was argued prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, No. 21-908, 598 U.S.

A mortgage loan repurchase facility (more casually referred to as a "repo") is a financing structure commonly utilized to finance mortgage loans. These facilities are utilized by both residential and commercial mortgage loan originators and aggregators to finance mortgage loans that they originate or acquire. The structure is favored by liquidity providers in the mortgage loan finance arena due to its preferential "safe harbor" treatment under the United States Bankruptcy Code (the "Bankruptcy Code"), as further described below.

Since 1993, decisions out of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York consistently adopted the aggregate “rent approach” for calculating lease rejection damages in bankruptcy proceedings. But in Bankruptcy Judge Wiles’ recent decision in In re Cortlandt Liquidating LLC, he departed from the “rent approach” in favor of the “time approach,” which is based on the time remaining under the lease rather than factoring in the total or aggregate rent still owed under the lease.

Lenders often attempt to limit what a borrower can do outside the ordinary course of business by negotiating contractual protections. Some of these provisions are designed to make the borrowers bankruptcy remote by, for example, requiring the borrower’s Board to include an independent director whose consent is required for a bankruptcy filing. Others, as was the case we discuss here, however, go further by including contractual rights that limit a borrower’s ability to file for bankruptcy without the lender’s consent.