A recent court ruling highlights the need for robust governance practices for nonprofits, particularly those facing financial difficulties. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a jury’s award of $2.25 million in compensatory damages against former directors and officers of a bankrupt nonprofit corporation - personal liability for breach of fiduciary duties and “deepening insolvency.”1 The court also affirmed punitive damages against the officer defendants, but vacated the award of punitive damages against the director defendants.
An important battle about the place of secured lending in the United States economy is set to begin. When the battle ends, fundamental assumptions about the expected recovery rates for defaulted secured loans may change.
On Monday, November 17, 2014, the United States Supreme Court agreed to decide a critical issue for mortgage lenders and secondary market investors, whether Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a Chapter 7 debtor to “strip off” a junior mortgage lien when the outstanding senior debt exceeds the current value of the senior lien. Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, No. 13-1421, 2014 WL 2207208 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2014); Bank of America, N.A. v. Toledo-Cardona, No. 14-163, 2014 WL 3965212 (U.S. Nov. 17, 2014).
Contexte
En février 2012, la fermeture des hauts fourneaux de Florange divise la classe politique. Le président François Hollande s’engage alors à ce que désormais tout société voulant mettre fin à son activité en France soit soumise à l’obligation de rechercher un repreneur.
Background
In February 2012, following the highly political closing of the Florange site, a steel production plant, President François Hollande vowed that going forward any company wanting to close down its operations in France would have an obligation to first look for a purchaser.
Given the unfortunate reputation of French courts for awarding substantial damages to employees for unfair terminations, US corporations with operations in France are anxious to limit their financial and legal exposure in case of litigation initiated by their French workforce. How to achieve this efficiently is a far from rhetorical question as French employees frequently pull in the US parent company as a named defendant. The recent decision of the French Supreme Court [Cass. Soc.
One of the more effective risk-mitigation legal tools used by senior real estate lenders is the single purpose entity borrower. Among other things, having a single purpose, bankruptcy remote borrower makes avoiding the risks of bankruptcy easier. Even in bankruptcy, if the borrower is truly single purpose, and it keeps the universe of creditors small, the senior secured lender will have an easier time defeating any plan of reorganization proposed by the borrower because it will control all of the legitimate classes of creditors by virtue of th
It has not taken long for another bankruptcy court to question the propriety of allowing secured creditors to credit bid their loans. You may recall that in the case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. a Delaware bankruptcy court limited a creditor’s ability to credit bid based on self-serving testimony from a competing bidder that it would not participate in an auction absent the court capping the secured creditor’s credit bid.
In a recent decision that has captured the attention of the U.S. secondary loan market, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington starkly concluded that hedge funds “that acquire distressed debt and engage in predatory lending” were not eligible buyers of a loan under a loan agreement because they were not “financial institutions” within the Court’s understanding of the phrase.
A recent decision in the bankruptcy case of Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc., et al. has called into question a long-held belief that secured creditors hold dear: that debt purchased at a discount can nonetheless be credit bid at its full face amount at a collateral sale. While it remains to be seen how other courts will interpret Fisker, this decision has the potential to restrict participation in Bankruptcy Code section 363 sales and dampen liquidity in the robust secondary markets.