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Section 1111(b) of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) is one of its least understood provisions, primarily due to its somewhat opaque language. This Code subsection is divided into two distinct but related parts. The first part, section 1111(b)(1), provides that a nonrecourse secured claim in a Chapter 11 case will be treated “as if such holder had recourse against the debtor on account of such claim, whether or not such holder has such recourse” subject to two exceptions.

Reliance Insurance Company was placed in liquidation on Oct. 3, 2001 by Order of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The Reliance liquidation was, and still is, one of the largest insurance company liquidations in U.S. history. Reliance has been in the process of marshaling assets and paying its liabilities for the past 12 years through a court-appointed Liquidator, namely the Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania.

Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Illinois mortgages entered prior to the amendment of 765 ILCS 5/11 need not strictly conform to the form presented in the statute. In re Crane, --- F.3d ---, 2013 WL 6731850 (7th Cir. Dec. 23, 2013). However, the court’s decision in Crane, considered as a whole, serves as a reminder to secured lenders to closely examine the contents of their mortgages and the requirements of applicable state law.

In recent years, bankruptcy courts have come closer to reaching a consensus regarding their ability to recharacterize debt into equity. Yet, beneath this consensus lies a deepening divide that lenders should be aware of. Recharacterization challenges “the assertion of a debt against the bankruptcy estate on the ground that the ‘loaned’ capital was actually an equity investment.” In re Insilco Techs., Inc., 480 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

“You cannot properly appraise the real seriousness of that situation unless you are right there in the city. Everything that frugal men and women put aside for years to save for old age, to get security for themselves –– every¬thing that they put aside to make the lot of their children a better one than their own, is now likely to be swept away. There is only one way that you can lighten the load of the municipality and that is to take its debt service off for the time being. Specifically, so that you will understand it, what is it in the city of Detroit?

Bankruptcy is intended to provide a fresh start and discharge outstanding debt.  But some debt is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.  A Virginia bankruptcy court held last week that a judgment against the debtor for intentional trade secret misappropriation is not dischargeable.

The Supreme Court of the United States denied a petition for writ of certiorari of the debtor, Castleton Plaza, LP, in Castleton Plaza, LP v. EL-SNPR Notes Holdings, LLC, Case No. 12-1422, meaning the prior opinion from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In the Matter of Castleton Plaza, LP, 707 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 2013), remains intact, protecting creditors who are faced with being shortchanged by a reorganization plan proposed by a debtor that attempts to transfer the future ownership of the debtor to an insider without first putting the ownership stake up for auction.

“You cannot properly appraise the real seriousness of that situation unless you are right there in the city. Everything that frugal men and women put aside for years to save for old age, to get security for themselves – everything that they put aside to make the lot of their children a better one than their own, is now likely to be swept away. There is only one way that you can lighten the load of the municipality and that is to take its debt service off for the time being. Specifically, so that you will understand it, what is it in the city of Detroit?

On August 21, 2013, in Wellness International Network v. Sharif, No. 12-1349 (7th Cir. August 21, 2013), the Seventh Circuit issued its latest opinion on the thorny issues emanating from the Supreme Court’s “narrow” decision in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct.