It is not unusual for a creditor of a debtor to cry foul that a non-debtor affiliate has substantial assets, but has not joined the bankruptcy. In some cases, the creditor may assert that even though its claim, on its face, is solely against the debtor, the debtor and the non-debtor conducted business as a single unit, or that the debtor indicated that the assets of the non-debtor were available to satisfy claims. In these circumstances, the creditor would like nothing more than to drag that asset-rich non-debtor into the bankruptcy to satisfy its claims. Is that possible?

The Supreme Court recently addressed two bankruptcy issues. In its opinion, the Court resolved a circuit split regarding the breadth of the safe harbor provision which protects certain transfers by financial institutions in connection with a securities contract. In Village at Lakeridge, the Court weighed in on the scope of appellate review and whether a bankruptcy court’s factual determination should be reviewed for clear error or de novo. These decisions are notable because they provide guidance on previously murky issues of bankruptcy law.

In a noteworthy decision, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit overturned a dismissal of a bankruptcy case, which the lower court had dismissed based on its belief that the landlord debtor was receiving rental income from a marijuana dispensary. The decision is significant because it holds that a bankruptcy cannot be dismissed simply because of the mere presence of a marijuana business or related proceeds in the case.

Is your guaranty restricted or continuing? A continuing guaranty gives rise to divisible individual transactions, while a restricted guaranty—one that concerns a contemplated and specified extension of credit—arises upon execution of the guaranty. In bankruptcy, as in life, timing is everything. A debtor’s liability under a prepetition guaranty agreement for a post-petition advance of credit may depend on the distinction between restricted and continuing, and the distinction may be subtle.

Judge Swain’s decision in the PROMESA Title III bankruptcy proceeding of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”) that a federal bankruptcy court cannot compel a municipal debtor to apply special revenues to post-petition debt service payments on special revenue bonds has generated controversy and caused some market participants to question whether, if the decision is upheld by the First Circuit on appeal, the perception that special revenue bonds have special rights in bankruptcy remains justified.

Last week, President Trump unveiled his proposal to fix our nation’s aging infrastructure. While the proposal lauded $1.5 trillion in new spending, it only included $200 billion in federal funding. To bridge this sizable gap, the plan largely relies on public private partnerships (often referred to as P3s) that can use tax-exempt bond financing.

Last week, President Trump unveiled his proposal to fix our nation’s aging infrastructure. While the proposal lauded $1.5 trillion in new spending, it only included $200 billion in federal funding. To bridge this sizable gap, the plan largely relies on public private partnerships (often referred to as P3s) that can use tax-exempt bond financing.

In the recently decided case, Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit took a hardline position that trademark license rights are not protected in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Code section 365(n) permits a licensee to continue to use intellectual property even if the debtor rejects the license agreement.

InIn Re Lexington Hospitality Group, LLC, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky thwarted a lender’s efforts to control whether its borrower could file bankruptcy. As a condition to the loan, the lender mandated that the borrower’s operating agreement have certain provisions that require the affirmative vote of an “Independent Manager” and 75% of the members to authorize a bankruptcy.

The Delaware bankruptcy court recently decided that a debtor could not assign a trademark license absent the consent of the licensor. The court concluded that federal trademark law and the terms of the license precluded assignment without consent. Because the debtor could not assign the license under any circumstances (consent was not forthcoming), the court held that cause existed to annul the automatic stay to permit the licensor to “move on with its trademark and its business.”