Introduction

On December 20, 2019, the honorable Marvin Isgur, judge of the Southern District of Texas Bankruptcy Court, issued an opinion holding that Alta Mesa Holdings (“Alta Mesa”), an upstream oil and gas producer with operations based in the STACK formation, could not, under Oklahoma law, reject certain gathering agreements in its bankruptcy case.1 The holding in Alta Mesa follows a similar outcome issued less than three months earlier in In re Badlands Energy, Inc.,2 a case decided by a Colorado bankruptcy court applying Utah law.

A New Jersey District Court recently addressed several issues in connection with the appointment of a future claims representative (“FCR”). In light of the recent increase in mass-tort bankruptcy cases, exploring these issues is timely.

Background

Background

Following various disputes as to the scope of the collateral given to secured creditors, the debtors and certain of their noteholders jointly proposed a chapter 11. The plan included a rights offering that the consenting noteholders agreed to backstop. These consenting noteholders were granted the right to purchase significant equity of the reorganized debtors at a discount and receive significant premiums for their agreement to backstop the rights offering and support the plan.

On July 24, 2019, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) issued the Consultation Paper on the Proposed Framework for Variable Capital Companies Part 3 (the Consultation Paper), which covers the proposed subsidiary legislation relating to the insolvency and winding up of a v

A recent decision out of the District Court for the Southern District of New York may bring greater certainty to the interpretation of what constitutes a “financial institution” in connection with the safe harbor in section 546(e) of the bankruptcy code. The decision, In re Tribune Fraudulent Conveyance Litig., 2019 U.S. Dist. Lexis 69081 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.

Merit Management

Sutton 58 Associates LLC v. Pilevsky et al., is a New York case which gets to the heart of the enforceability of classic single-purpose entity restrictions in commercial real estate lending. At issue is how far a third-party may go to cause a violation of a borrower’s SPE covenants, and whether those covenants are enforceable at all.

A Defaulted Construction Loan and Frustrated Attempts to Foreclose:

In Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a question that vexed the lower courts and resulted in a circuit split: does the rejection by a debtor-licensor of a trademark license agreement terminate the licensee’s rights under the rejected license?

Despite recent decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Momentive) and the Fifth Circuit (Ultra) questioning the enforceability of make-whole provisions in bankruptcy, on March 18, 2019, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York determined in 1141 Realty that the make-whole provision contained in a loan agreement was enforceable notwithstanding acceleration of the loan by the secured lender.

Background on Enforceability of Make-Whole Provisions in Bankruptcy