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If a transaction by a company amounts to an "unlawful distribution", and the company subsequently goes into liquidation, will an action for recovery of the benefits of that distribution, brought against the directors who authorised the transaction, be statute-barred if it is commenced by the liquidator of the company more than 6 years after the distribution was made?

DOMESTIC

Research on the impact of repossession risk on mortgage default

Terry O’Malley published an economic letter considering whether reducing the risk of repossession resulted in more Irish borrowers defaulting on their mortgages. The letter considers the impact of the ''Dunne judgment'' in 2011 which temporarily removed a bank's ability to lawfully repossess a home. One of the key findings was that borrowers defaulted on mortgages at a higher rate than if the repossession regime at the time was legally upheld.

Introduction

There are two principal mechanisms for the dissolution of a solvent Irish company:

  • Voluntary Strike-Off (VSO); and
  • Members' Voluntary Liquidation (MVL).

To the extent there are other Irish or EU entities in the group, it may also be possible to dissolve the company by way of merger with another group entity.

In Reilly & Personal Insolvency Acts 2012-2015 [2017] IEHC 558, Baker J, 5 October, 2017, the High Court held that applications to Court under Section 115A of the Personal Insolvency Acts 2012-2015 (the Acts), for approval of a Personal Insolvency Arrangement (PIA) despite its rejection by creditors, must be made by a Personal Insolvency Practitioner (PIP) and not by the Debtor themselves.

Baker J in the High Court has given three recent judgments in matters concerning Section 115A(9) of the Personal Insolvency Acts 2012 – 2015 (the Acts). This Section gives a Court power to review and approve a Personal Insolvency Application (PIA) rejected at a meeting of creditors.

Re JD (a debtor) [2017] IEHC 119, High Court, 21 February 2017

In a High Court decision of 22 May 2017 Baker J rejected a proposal by a secured lender to write down a portion of a debtor couple's mortgage debt and warehouse half of the debt as future repayment of the warehoused part of the loan was not predicated on an ability to repay. Thus, the proposal was capable of creating circumstances amounting to insolvency at the end of the mortgage term in approximately 23 years.

Facts

Intercreditor agreements between multiple lenders are part and parcel of lending to a company with several tranches of debt. Under section 510 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”), “[a] subordination agreement is enforceable in a case under this title to the same extent that such agreement is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law.” 11 U.S.C. § 510(a) (West 2017).

The sole shareholder of several closely held corporate entities engages in a fraudulent transfer by extinguishing one entity’s right to payment from a third party in exchange for the release of liabilities owed by other entities to that same third party. In Motorworld, Inc. v. William Benkendorf, et al., __ N.J. __ (Mar. 30, 2017), the New Jersey Supreme Court voided such a transfer against a Chapter 7 debtor corporation whose sole asset was a $600,000 loan receivable purportedly cancelled by the release.

The Irish Government has signed an Order giving the Cape Town Convention Alternative A insolvency remedy force of law in Ireland.

The Cape Town Convention creates an international uniform body of law applicable to interests in aircraft assets for the protection of financiers, lessors and conditional sellers and to establish basic remedies available to them under agreements relating to the aircraft assets.

The Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. ___ (2017)1 on March 21, reversing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ affirmance of an order approving the distribution of the proceeds of settlement of bankruptcy estate causes of action to general unsecured creditors via structured dismissal, with no distribution to holders of priority wage claims.

The Court framed the question presented, and its ruling, very narrowly—twice. First: