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The Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated ruling in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. ___ (2017)1 on March 21, reversing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ affirmance of an order approving the distribution of the proceeds of settlement of bankruptcy estate causes of action to general unsecured creditors via structured dismissal, with no distribution to holders of priority wage claims.

The Court framed the question presented, and its ruling, very narrowly—twice. First:

Gift vouchers are often considered an easy and convenient option when purchasing gifts for friends and family. For the relative with unusual taste, the friend who lives in another part of the UK or the husband and wife to be who already have everything, a gift voucher may appear to be the ideal gift. But what happens if, before the recipient has the opportunity to redeem the voucher, the relevant retailer becomes insolvent?

In terms of current insolvency law consumers are ordinary creditors who rank at the bottom of the statutory hierarchy of creditors.

In a very recent decision, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York determined that a negative inference to an exception to a negative covenant prevented a company from undertaking a proposed restructuring transaction. We find the case unique not because of the result necessarily, but rather because the court used the negative inference to override another express provision in the Credit Agreement.

Although there has been much discussion of the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Marblegate, this article addresses a question other commentators have yet to tackle: namely, how the Second Circuit’s decision impacts the Trust Indenture Act’s protection of guarantee obligations included in an indenture. Below we provide our view on how Marblegate affects indenture guarantees. More specifically, we discuss how the decision is consistent with provisions of the TIA that expressly protect a noteholder’s payment rights under a guarantee.

Synopsis

The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 came into force yesterday, 30 November 2016, together with other consequential amendments and changes to the Court Rules which relate to bankruptcy in Scotland.

When considering whether or not to bring a legal action, it is important to establish if it is competent and commercially worthwhile to do so. The ability to bring, or continue with, legal proceedings against a company can be restricted if that company enters into a formal insolvency process. The position of creditors may be improved now that the Third Party (Rights Against Insurers) Act 2010 has at last been brought into force.

Bankruptcy made clearer: One of the bastions of old-style Scots terminology, guaranteed to perplex Southern audiences, is the law of bankruptcy in Scotland as it applies to individuals and assorted others.

But maybe for no longer. The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 has reached the statute book. It’s a consolidating act, encompassing statutes from 1985, 1993, 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2014. It introduces a new and fairly modern framework, the aim being to make it less cumbersome and easier to use by those who do not have intimate knowledge of it (most of us!).

The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 (the “Act”) received Royal Assent on 28 April 2016 and is expected to come into force by the end of the year.

The Act is only the second piece of primary consolidation legislation to have passed through the Scottish Parliament and brings together the various laws on personal insolvency into a single piece of legislation.

At the moment, the law is rather unwieldy and difficult to follow in practice.

On September 18, 2015, Margaret M. Okamoto (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint (the “Complaint”) in The United States District Court for the District of Nevada alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (the “FCRA”), against, inter alia, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”), Mutual of Omaha Bank (“MOB”), and Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”).  See Okamoto v. Bank of America et al., No. 2:15-cv-01800-GMN-GWF (Sept. 18, 2015).

In the bankruptcy context, effectively appealing an order confirming a debtor’s plan of reorganization is not always a sure bet, as a court may refuse to entertain the appeal in the name of equitable mootness.  Equitable mootness – “a judge-made abstention doctrine that allows a court to avoid hearing the merits of a bankruptcy appeal because implementing the requested relief would cause havoc”